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EXIT, VOICE, AND REPUTATION: THE EVOLUTION OF SPACS 
BY USHA RODRIGUES AND MIKE STEGEMOLLER∗  
ABSTRACT 
This Article tells the story of a new type of business—the special 
purpose acquisition corporation ("SPAC").  The promoters of a SPAC 
begin by forming a shell corporation with no assets.  They then take the 
company public on little more than a promise that they will strive to 
complete the acquisition of a target in the near future.  We present the first 
empirical study of the SPAC contract design, and use a hand-collected 
dataset to trace its evolution over the past nine years. 
While SPACs are a new form, their contract design borrows heavily 
from private equity's playbook.  Private equity managers famously (and 
sometimes controversially) receive 20% of their funds' profits, and funds 
typically last only ten years.  From the traditional 20% incentive 
compensation to a short investment shelf life, SPAC entrepreneurs tried to 
transfer many hallmarks of the private equity contract to the public market.  
Reputational constraints got lost in translation.  The private equity 
fund model is built on repeat business, and reputation is a crucial 
contractual gap filler.  In contrast, SPACs are one-shot deals.  Without 
managerial reputation to rely on, investors demanded increasing amounts of 
"skin in the game" from SPAC managers, and placed more conditions on 
managerial claims to 20% of the profits.  On the other hand, without the 
force of reputation constraining investors, a supermajority vote created a 
powerful holdout right, which shareholders used to exploit SPACs until the 
form evolved to eliminate it.  Our study of SPACs—by demonstrating the 
ways in which parties contract for credibility in the absence of long-term 
relationships between investors and managers—thus underscores the 
importance of reputation to the relational dynamics in traditional private 
equity. 
Aside from making private equity publicly tradable (with its 
concomitant loss of reputation as gap filler), SPACs' chief innovations were 
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in the classic governance mechanisms of voice and exit.  SPACs evolved 
from granting investors a supermajority vote to eliminating the vote 
altogether.  At the same time, they granted investors an even stronger walk-
away right.  Thus, the SPAC story, new as it is, casts light on an old 
governance question: the relative value of voice and exit.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The development of a new kind of corporation is a rare occurrence.  
Yet in recent years, such a new species has emerged—the special purpose 
acquisition corporation, or "SPAC."  SPACs constitute a uniquely public 
form of private equity fund.  The promoters of a SPAC take the entity public 
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as a shell corporation and then commence a time-limited hunt for an 
acquisition target.1  If a target is found, investors in the SPAC have a pre-
acquisition choice either to get their money back, or to remain as 
shareholders of the now-public firm.2  Sometimes called a "poor man's 
private equity fund,"3 SPACs give a wide range of investors an opportunity 
previously only afforded to accredited (i.e., wealthy) investors: the 
opportunity to invest in a fund that acquires a private company.4 
The SPAC's developers did not, however, create this new corporate 
form from whole cloth.  Almost every SPAC feature borrows from the 
playbook of the traditional private equity firm.5  The most well known forms 
of private equity are venture capital and leveraged-buyout ("LBO" or 
"buyout") funds.6  In this multi-billion dollar industry, sophisticated 
investors entrust their money to managers, who then invest the funds in a 
variety of private targets.7  At their inception, the creators of SPACs 
attempted to translate key private equity features to the public markets, and 
the law of unintended consequences promptly went to work.8   
 
                                                                                                             
1William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Truth About Reverse Mergers, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. 
L.J. 743, 756 (2008).  Sjostrom's article describes SPACs as a species of reverse merger, and at a 
high level of generality.  See id. at 756-59.  In contrast, we conduct an empirical analysis of 
individual characteristics of SPACs, and document how they change over time.   
2See id. at 758 (citation omitted).  
3See, e.g., Jim Fink, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs): Will Investors Live 
Long and Prosper?, INVESTING DAILY (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.investingdaily.com/10914/ 
special-purpose-acquisition-companies-spacs-will-investors-live-long-and-prosper.  
4See Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 172, 225 
(2008):  
SPACs are a species of private equity: these are capital pools organized to 
acquire individual businesses.  But because of the general requirement that the 
initial acquisition comprise eighty percent of its assets, SPACs typically only 
acquire a single privately-held business.  Despite these important distinctions, 
SPACs otherwise attempt to mimic private equity returns by employing 
comparable structures and practices.  For example, SPACs utilize similar leverage 
to increase the size and potential returns of their acquisitions.  The managers of 
SPACs are also typically provided twenty percent of the initial share offering at 
nominal amounts; ownership they are required to maintain until and after 
consummation of an acquisition. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Carol Boyer & Glenn Baigent, SPACs as Alternative Investments: 
An Examination of Performance and Factors that Drive Prices, 11 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 8, 8 (2008) 
("SPACs . . . provide the public with access to the private equity investments area, which was 
previously available only to institutional clients such as hedge funds and investment banks.").  
5See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 4, at 225. 
6See infra Part II.  
7See infra Part II.  
8See Davidoff, supra note 4, at 225-28 ("[T]he SPAC phenomenon has been publicly 
attributed and promoted as a private equity substitute, one the public can now freely access.").  
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The problem for the SPAC's inventors was that private equity's 
contract was delicately calibrated for an essentially private relationship.  
Private equity's contractual strategies simultaneously reassure both investors 
and fund managers in a setting ripe for opportunism on both sides.9  Fund 
managers must convince the mistrustful wealthy investor to hand over 
money, despite considerable information asymmetries (i.e., the managers 
know much more about the value of their talents and the venture's prospects 
for success than the investors do)10 coupled with the familiar risk of agency 
costs (i.e., the goals of self-interested agents necessarily diverge from the 
interests of the principals they represent).11  Private equity managers employ 
a variety of strategies to comfort the nervous investor who faces these real-
world difficulties.12  Incentive compensation means that the manager only 
profits if his investors do.13  Requiring the manager to invest his own money 
in the fund further aligns incentives by ensuring that he internalizes some 
downside costs if the fund fails to perform—the so-called "skin in the 
game."14  Furthermore, investors make payments for their equity positions in 
stages, delivering only a portion of the promised investment up front.15  To 
 
                                                                                                             
9See generally Kate Litvak, Governance Through Exit: Default Penalties and Walkaway 
Options in Venture Capital Partnership Agreements, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 771, 773 (2004) 
[hereinafter Litvak, Governance Through Exit] (describing the value of a venture capital investor's 
bargained-for right to withdraw support if displeased with the fund's management); Kate Litvak, 
Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements: Understanding Compensation Arrangements, 76 
U. CHI. L. REV. 161, 162 (2009) [hereinafter Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership 
Agreements] (stating that venture capital fund managers, as opposed to corporate managers, bargain 
for their compensation with the funds' investors); Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, An Analysis of 
Compensation in the U.S. Venture Capital Partnership, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4, 6 (1999) [hereinafter 
Gompers & Lerner, Analysis of Compensation] (describing how the contract between venture 
capital fund managers and investors controls management salaries); William A. Sahlman, The 
Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 489-93 (1990) 
(describing the various components of venture capital contracts, including management 
compensation and profit distributions); Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of 
Private Equity Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2303, 2304 (2010) (explaining the "fixed and variable 
components" of the general partners/managers' compensation, as outlined in the contract between 
the general partners/managers and limited partners/investors).   
10Sahlman, supra note 9, at 493 ("In the venture-capital industry, the agency problem is 
likely to be particularly difficult.  There is inevitably a high degree of information asymmetry 
between the venture capitalists, who play an active role in the portfolio companies, and the limited 
partners, who cannot monitor the prospects of each individual investment as closely."). 
11Id. ("Venture capitalists have many opportunities to take advantage of the people who 
invest with them.").  
12See infra Part VI. 
13See infra Part VI.A.1. 
14See infra Part VI.A.2. 
15Sahlman, supra note 9, at 491. 
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prevent the manager from merely sitting on the money, the fund faces a 
limited investment horizon; after ten years, investors get their money back.16  
In private equity, overarching all of these contractual protections 
against agency costs and informational asymmetries looms reputation.  Each 
private equity firm operates several different funds at one time, and 
successful managers expect to go on to raise subsequently larger, and 
correspondingly more profitable, funds.17  If a manager wants to succeed in 
the private equity world, she must develop a reputation for making wise 
choices for her investors.18  SPACs mimicked nearly all of traditional private 
equity's contractual features reasonably well but, being publicly traded one-
shot deals, they lost the beneficial effects of reputation.19   
On the other side of the relationship, just as investors have their 
misgivings about managers, managers have their own reasons to be fearful of 
investors.  SPACs seemed to improve on the risks that managers face in 
traditional private equity.20  Because private equity investors make payments 
in stages, they may be tempted to treat their promise of future funding more 
like an option, and renege if the fund fails to perform as expected or if 
their personal financial circumstances change.21  Again, in private equity, 
reputation steps into the breach.22  Most private equity investors are pension 
funds and wealthy individual investors; they face harsh reputational 
sanctions if they do not honor their commitments.23  These sanctions are 
potent because of the risk of being locked out of future private equity 
investments—and the 20% (or higher) annual returns that the funds often 
generate.24  That, in turn, counterbalances the moral hazard risk that investors 
will renege.25  In contrast, SPAC managers receive the money up front.26  
 
                                                                                                             
16See id. at 490.  
17See infra Part II.C. 
18See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain, Steven M. Davidoff & Antonio J. Macias, Broken Promises: 
Private Equity Bidding Behavior and the Value of Reputation, AFA 2012 CHI. MEETINGS 1, 11 
(Sept. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1540000## 
(citation omitted) ("[R]eputation is valuable as it improves the ability of the firm to attract future 
capital investments from limited partners.").  
19See infra Part VIII.  
20See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 757-58.  
21See Sahlman, supra note 9, at 491.  
22See Cain, Davidoff & Macias, supra note 18, at 11.  
23See Sahlman, supra note 9, at 491. 
24Id. at 491, 513-14; see also Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, & Robert E. Scott, 
Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2010) (stating that breach of an informal contract can damage 
a reputation, which can reduce the party's chances for future business opportunities).  
25See Sahlman, supra note 9, at 491.  
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Therefore, investors' funds are safe in a trust account and are only released 
on acquisition. Accordingly, managers can rest assured that the money is 
actually available and not subject to an investor’s response to future capital 
calls.27   
In sum, reputational constraints hold the richly dynamic tension 
between traditional private equity investors and managers largely in 
equilibrium.28  But the SPAC entrepreneurs shook things up: they made the 
investment publicly tradable and thus subject to public reporting 
requirements.29  Because of the anonymous interactions of the public 
markets, reputation no longer constrained either side.30  Cognizant of the 
need to reassure skittish investors in this new form, SPACs' creators gave 
investors a vote on any proposed acquisition, as well as a low-cost exit right 
available for use before any pending deal was finalized.31  The trust account 
comforted not only investors, but also managers, who no longer had to fear 
that investors would not honor their capital commitments.32 
While the SPACs preserved (and indeed strengthened) traditional 
private equity's mechanisms for addressing information asymmetries and 
agency costs, the creation of a public entity removed a key reputational 
check on managers and investors alike.33  Lacking the ability to control the 
identity of their investors, SPACs proved vulnerable to new kinds of investor 
opportunism.34  On the flipside, SPACs are one-off transactions, so 
reputational constraints on managers no longer had much traction.35  We 
document how SPACs have evolved their managerial compensation and 
                                                                                                             
26See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 758 ("[T]he operating company will receive a large cash 
infusion because the SPAC with whom it merges will contain the proceeds from its IPO.").  
27See id.  
28See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 24, at 1379-80 (explaining generally the role of 
reputation in informal contract enforcement); Sahlman, supra note 9, at 513. 
29Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 756-58 (explaining SEC Rule 419 governing "blank check 
companies" and how SPACs, although technically not under that rule's purview, nonetheless 
incorporate some of its features in order to provide investor security) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 230.419 
(2007)).   
30See id. at 758.  
31Id.; Davidoff, supra note 4, at 225.  
32See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 758.  
33See id.; Amanda Thompson, Organizational Form and Investment Decisions: The Case of 
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies 12-13 (Jan. 2012) (unpublished dissertation, Purdue 
University), available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?did=2344790561&Fmt=7&clientI 
d=79356&RQT=309&VName=PQD; see also Davidoff, supra note 4, at 225 (discussing the rights 
of investors in SPACs, i.e. the right to pre-approve the acquisition).  
34See discussion of "greenmailing" infra Part III.A.  
35See Thompson, supra note 33, at 12-13 (asserting that reputational checks are only 
important to SPAC managers in the pre-acquisition phase, as opposed to the post-acquisition phase 
of the venture). 
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voting schemes in order to compensate for the absence of the ameliorating 
influence of reputation.  The SPAC experience thus demonstrates the 
importance of reputation to both sides of the private equity contract.   
The literature has so far paid only glancing attention to SPACs, 
describing their function at a high level of generality.36  Researchers have 
overlooked the wealth of empirical data SPACs' public disclosures afford.  
Likewise, scholars have ignored what light this uniquely public form of 
private equity can shed on the classic private equity contract.  
In this Article we summarize an original hand-collected dataset, drawn 
from public SPAC filings, and use it to trace the evolution of key 
characteristics in the development of this new breed of corporate form.  We 
provide the first detailed empirical description of SPACs, highlighting their 
similarities and differences with traditional private equity firms.  
Managerial compensation in both cases is incentive driven, with managers 
reaping 20% of the gains achieved by the investment fund.37  Although the 
original SPACs required only a nominal upfront investment by promoters, 
they evolved to require promoter investment, or "skin in the game," just as 
venture and buyout funds do.38   
On the other hand, our empirical study shows that SPACs diverge in 
notable ways from the traditional private equity template, in part because the 
SPAC investment time horizon is much shorter—a matter of two to three 
years, rather than ten.39  The most notable deviations from the traditional 
private equity mold involve exit and voice—the chief protections available 
to investors.40  As to exit, the bulk of the money that SPAC shareholders 
invest in the company has always been initially "locked up" in a trust 
account and made subject to recapture by those shareholders, at least under 
 
                                                                                                             
36See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 4, at 224-28 (providing a general overview of SPACs).  
37See, e.g., id. at 225 (describing SPAC managers' ownership interests in the venture).  
38See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity 
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008); Spicing Up the SPAC Structure: Underwriters Tweak New 
Offerings to Entice Investors, THE REVERSE MERGER REPORT, 11 (Nov. 2005), available at 
http://www.littmankrooks.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Spicing-Up-the-SPAC-Structure.pdf 
("One of the first innovations investment bankers added to SPACs is management [share] purchase 
agreements.  The commitment by management to buy warrants demonstrates to potential investors 
that management has a real financial investment because if a deal is not consummated the [shares] 
purchased will expire and be worthless.").   
39See infra Part V.  
40See John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 892 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("All investors confront a 
choice between exit and voice.  That is, they can participate in corporate governance (thereby 
exercising voice) or they can rely on market liquidity (i.e., exit).").  
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most conditions.41  As to voice, as originally conceived, SPAC investors 
received a vote—two votes, really—on any proposed acquisition.  First, if a 
majority of the SPAC investors voted against the acquisition, it would not 
occur.42  Second, if more than a specified percentage (called the conversion 
threshold) of SPAC investors cashed out their shares from the trust fund—
typically 20% in early SPACs—the acquisition would not go forward.43  In 
effect, the creation of this second right gave rise to a supermajority voting 
requirement for any acquisition.44 
Our research reveals that the original SPAC template worked only 
until the market figured out its fatal flaw.   In transplanting the model from 
the insular world of private equity to the faceless public market, the 
leavening influence of reputation was lost.45  Investors were free to act 
opportunistically—and so they did.46  The supermajority requirement created 
what turned out to be a costly holdout right.47  As a result, the most recent 
SPACs have reduced shareholder voting rights, making the majority vote 
optional (at the managers' discretion) and raising the deal-rejection threshold 
to 88% or higher—that is, 88% of shareholders must cash out before an 
acquisition fails.48  The SPAC shareholder vote, a key selling point of the 
initial form, has thus been largely eliminated.49  At the same time, trust 
account rights have grown in strength and importance.50  Initially, SPACs 
promised that 85% of investor money would be placed in escrow.51  Over 
 
                                                                                                             
41See, e.g., M. Ridgway Barker & Randi-Jean G. Hedin, Special Purpose Acquisition 
Corporations: Specs to Consider When Structuring Your SPAC – Part I, METRO. CORP. 
COUNSEL, 6 (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/August/06.pdf 
(describing how SPAC investment capital, held in trust, can be reclaimed by investors).   
42See, e.g., id. (describing how the SPAC's proposed acquisition is subject to a majority of 
investors' approval and how dissenting investors can, if they choose, receive their money back).  
43M. Ridgway Barker & Randi-Jean G. Hedin, SPACs – Continuing to Grow and Evolve, 
METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, 38 (June 2007), available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/ 
2007/June/38.pdf ("Most typical SPACs require that the acquisition be approved by a majority of 
its public stockholders and that not more than 20% of its stockholders vote against the acquisition 
and elect to convert their shares for cash.").  
44See id.   
45See, e.g., Daniel S. Riemer, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: SPAC and Span, or 
Blank Check Redux?, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 931, 960 (describing the ease with which investors can 
enter and exit SPACs). 
46See, e.g., id.   
47See infra Part VII.A.  
48This change started with the 57th Street General Acquisition Corporation in 2009.  See 
infra Part VII.A. 
49See infra Part VII.A.  
50See infra Part VII.B. 
51See infra Part VII.B.  
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time, as competition among SPACs increased, that percentage rose to 95% 
and even 100%.52  In fact, the most recent SPACs now go so far as to 
promise to return to investors more than they put in.53  On the manager's side, 
the contract has evolved to require managerial investment in SPACs and to 
condition managerial equity payoffs on market performance.54  We suggest 
that these mechanisms may function as public market substitutes for the 
missing reputational constraint.55 
Finally, the story of SPACs' evolution contributes to the literature on 
the relative value of voice and exit.  Professor Albert O. Hirschman's classic 
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty first described the mechanisms by which 
consumers or investors could express disapproval of organizational choices.56 
Hirschman's insight has been applied in a myriad of contexts, from securities 
class actions,57 to local government services,58 to the viability of Delaware's 
dominance of corporate law,59 to the federalism debate.60  In a recent article, 
Professors John Morley and Quinn Curtis posit that voting in mutual funds 
may be a less reliable constraint on agency costs because exit is so cheap—
cheaper even than in a publicly traded corporation.61  SPACs reveal that, like 
all investor-protection mechanisms, the grant of the vote has costs as well as 
benefits; the costs of voting quickly became apparent as hold-outs by some 
shareholders exposed other shareholders—including promoters—to counter-
efficient results.62  The vote receded in importance as the shareholders' walk-
 
                                                                                                             
52See infra Part VII.B.  
53See, e.g., Universal Bus. Payment Solutions Acquisition Corp., Amendment No. 5 to 
Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (Apr. 29, 2011) (offering price of $6.00 per unit, trust value 
$6.06); Trio Merger Corp., Amendment No. 5 to Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (June 6, 
2011) (offering price of $10.00 per unit, trust value $10.10). 
54See infra Part VI.A.2.  
55See infra Part VIII.   
56ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 3-4 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1970).  
57See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 376 (2000). 
58See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 476 (1991); Carol M. Rose, What 
Federalism Tells Us About Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1681, 1687 (2007). 
59See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125, 152 (2009). 
60See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term Foreword: Federalism All the 
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14 & n.19 (2010) (discussing scholars' use of the concepts of 
voice and exit and distinguishing her own). 
61John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee 
Litigation Don't Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 89-91 (2010).  
62See Thomas Friedmann & D. Chad Larson, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: A 
SPAC Evolution, THE HEDGE FUND J. (May 2008), http://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/magazine/ 
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away right became more robust.63  SPACs, however, did not merely address 
the hold-out problem by requiring a simple majority.  Recent SPACs have 
entirely removed the shareholder vote on acquisition.64  This effective 
elimination of the vote offers empirical support for Morley and Curtis's 
thesis by demonstrating that, as an exit vote becomes more robust, 
shareholders will tolerate even the complete eradication of a voting right.65  
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II situates SPACs within the 
private equity landscape by describing the two predominant forms of private 
equity, venture capital funds and leveraged buyout funds.  Part III introduces 
the SPAC, tracing the origins and history of this new business form.  Part IV 
offers three case studies to give a more textured understanding of the array of 
fates that SPACs can meet; some SPACs fail to complete their IPO, some go 
public but fail to complete an acquisition, and some successfully locate a 
target and merge with it, enabling a once-private company to trade publicly 
without an IPO.  Part V provides an overview of the data from our original 
dataset.  Part VI then compares our new SPAC data with the features of 
traditional private equity funds, including managerial compensation, the 
lifespan of the fund, and limits on the amount the fund can invest.  
In general, Part VI reveals that SPACs hew fairly closely to the traditional 
private equity template.  Particularly in the area of managerial investment, or 
"skin in the game," early SPACs deviated from the private equity playbook, 
but more recent ones have adhered to it.66 
Part VII highlights the two main differences between SPACs and the 
rest of private equity.  In contrast to private equity investors, early SPAC 
investors had robust voting and exit rights.67  Part VII also traces the 
evolution of these twin rights.  Most notably, we find that as the form 
evolved, the voting right weakened, while exit rights strengthened.  We 
include a case study of the SPACs of one particular investment bank—the 
successor to the investment bank that first developed SPACs—to illustrate 
that the trends we identify are not merely the result of new entrants; the 
                                                                                                             
200805/technical/a-spac-evolution.php (describing how some SPAC investors/hedge fund 
arbitrageurs vote against the SPAC's proposed acquisition, "thereby making themselves eligible to 
redeem their shares and receive proceeds from the SPAC trust fund or to receive cash upon the 
SPAC's liquidation").  
63See id. (stating that recently, SPAC investors/hedge fund arbitrageurs have opted for 
selling their shares to long-term investors).  
64See infra Part VII.A; see also Friedmann & Larson, supra note 62 ("SPACs' founders are 
now revamping SPACs' terms to attract long-term investors and to induce shareholders to vote for a 
proposed business combinations [sic].").  
65See infra Part VIII.  
66See infra Part VI.A.2.  
67See infra Part VII.  
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original SPAC entrepreneurs followed the same trend of strengthening exit 
rights and weakening the vote.68  Part VIII then explores the implications of 
the SPAC story.  It emphasizes that SPAC developers appear to have 
underestimated the effect of reputation in addressing private equity's 
information asymmetries and moral hazard problems.  The form has evolved 
mechanisms to substitute for the absence of reputational constraints in the 
public market.69  The move toward complete elimination of the vote 
contributes to the literature on voice and exit, suggesting that given a cheap 
enough exit, investors no longer demand any vote as a tool for constraining 
agency costs.70 
II.  TRADITIONAL PRIVATE EQUITY 
In order to understand SPACs, we must first understand their origins.  
Although Part III will trace the particulars of SPAC history, these new 
entities only make sense when situated in the larger world of private equity.  
Developers consciously modeled many SPAC elements after the form's 
private equity forbearers.71  Where they depart from the traditional model, the 
deviations are best understood in light of the larger private equity context.  
First, a word on terminology: venture capital ("VC") and leveraged 
buyout ("LBO") funds comprise part of the larger universe that is sometimes 
termed "private equity."  Private equity, understood broadly, encompasses 
any investment in a private company.72  Private equity is also sometimes used 
as a synonym for investment entities that acquire both public and private 
companies financed principally by debt—i.e., funds that were once called 
buyout funds are now sometimes referred to as private equity funds.73  For 
clarity we will refer to these funds as "buyout funds," but some citations will 
refer to them as "private equity."   
Second, a word on this Article's area of interest.  The financial 
contracting literature has focused largely on the relationship between fund 
 
                                                                                                             
68See infra Part VII.C.  
69See infra Part VIII.  
70See infra Part VIII.  
71See Davidoff, supra note 4, at 225.  
72Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 482 n.4 
(2009).  
73Id.; see also Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 
23 J. ECON. PERSP., 121, 121 (2009), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/steven.kaplan/ 
research/ksjep.pdf ("The leveraged buyout investment firms today refer to themselves (and are 
generally referred to) as private equity firms.").  
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and target.74  This focus is understandable, given that entrepreneurial firms 
are a locus of innovation and figuring out how best to finance them is a 
subject of continued debate.75  But the relationship between investor and 
fund also matters.  Many U.S. businesses, from start-ups to established 
companies, rely on pools of money helmed by managers that claim to be able 
to identify an undervalued company and manage it better.  Accordingly, 
this Article focuses on the investor/investment vehicle relationship; as 
SPACs further develop, future work will explore the success (or failure) of 
SPACs' investments in particular targets.  
 
Figure 1.  
Individual investor 
 
 
 
Fund/investment vehicle 
 
 
 
Target/company 
A.  Venture Capital 
VC funds invest in early-stage companies (i.e. start-up firms).  These 
funds, however, do not acquire start-up firms outright; rather, their strategy 
involves investing early, when shares are cheap, and hoping that they will 
 
                                                                                                             
74See, e.g., Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements, supra note 9, at 162 
("A large body of theoretical and empirical studies concentrates on the relationship between venture 
capitalists . . . and entrepreneurs who run young companies, yet very little is written on the 
relationship between VCs and investors in venture funds.").  VC funds stage their commitment to 
start-ups, preserving the option for the fund to abandon a company whose business model does not 
pan out as expected.  See Litvak, Governance Through Exit, supra note 9, at 773 
("[S]taged financing of portfolio companies and the accompanying threat of VC walkaway 
improve incentives of entrepreneurs of portfolio companies.").  Both private equity and VC 
funds also employ incentive compensation for a target company's management by granting options 
that tie compensation to the fate of the company.  See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 121.  
These are important questions, but we set them aside in order to focus our lens more closely on the 
investor/fund relationship.  
75See, e.g., Gompers & Lerner, Analysis of Compensation, supra note 9, at 6 (describing the 
"reluctan[ce]" of early VC investors).   
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make five or even ten times their initial investment (the much-desired "home 
run") when the company eventually goes public or is acquired (i.e. "getting 
in on the ground floor").76  Ideally, VC funds partner with management and 
help the fledgling corporation grow.77  Venture-backed companies are more 
likely to succeed than the average start-up because talented venture capital 
managers spot promising companies and (arguably) provide advice that 
helps pave the road to success.78  To give some perspective, in 2011, there 
was over $195 billion of VC funds under management,79 with over $28 
billion raised in that year.80   
VC fund investors are wealthy individuals, pension funds, 
endowments, and insurance companies.81  Indeed, VC funds typically only 
allow participation from individuals who are accredited investors.82  The 
wealth test for accredited investors includes individuals with a net worth 
over $1 million or an individual income of $200,000 in the past year, with a 
reasonable expectation of the same income in the coming year.83  For those 
investors who make the cut, VC funds have offered returns of 16-20% a 
year.84  
VC funds are generally structured as limited partnerships.85  The fund 
managers serve as the general partners ("GPs"), and the investors are limited 
 
                                                                                                             
76See, e.g., id. at 5 (stating that VC fund managers look  for "high-potential companies" 
which in time can be offered to the public); RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE-GLOBAL EDITION 392 n.4 (10th ed. 2011), available at 
https://connect.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/007131430x/student_view0/ebook/chapter15/chbody1/15-
1_venture_capital.htm ("[V]enture capitalists . . . get in on the ground floor.").  
77See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 76, at 392 ("[M]any adolescent companies raise 
capital from specialist venture-capital firms, which pool funds from a variety of investors, seek out 
fledgling companies to invest in, and then work with these companies as they try to grow.").   
78See id. at 393 ("Venture capital firms . . . provide ongoing advice to the firms that they 
invest in and often play a major role in recruiting the senior management team.  Their judgment and 
contacts can be valuable to a business in its early years and can help the firm to bring its products 
more quickly to market.").   
79See National Venture Capital Association Yearbook 2012, THOMPSON REUTERS, 9 
(2012) http://www.nvca.org/index.php?searchword=Yearbook&ordering=&searchphrase=all&Itemi
d=103&option=com_search.  
80Id. at 11-13.  
81Sahlman, supra note 9, at 488. 
82See Robert G. Frucht & Tasneem S. Novak, No Direction: The Obama Administration's 
Financial Reform Proposal and Pending Legislation Proposing the Registration and Further 
Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Pools of Equity are Overbroad and Fail to Address the 
Actual Risks That These Funds Pose to the Financial System, 29 B.U. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
157, 168 (2009).   
8317 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a)(5)-(6) (2011). 
84Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of Private Equity, 35 DEL J. CORP. L. 259, 261 (2010). 
85See, e.g., Sahlman, supra note 9, at 487 ("[Five hundred] firms with $20 billion in capital 
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partners ("LPs").86  The GPs manage the limited partnership and assume 
general liability, while the limited partners enjoy limited liability, but may 
not manage.87  As such, the LPs have little to no voice in running the fund, 
and, in particular, do not have a say on individual investment decisions.88  
LPs do have limited information rights, however: they receive periodic 
reports and have an annual meeting with the GPs and portfolio company 
management teams.89  Investors generally commit to contribute a certain 
amount to the fund, paying a percentage up front and then phasing in the rest 
of their investment over several years.90  Notably, there are harsh penalties if 
a limited partner reneges on the commitment to contribute.91   
The roster of companies in which a fund has invested is termed its 
"portfolio," and the companies in which it invests are "portfolio 
companies."92  One study found a median of twenty investments per fund.93  
Funds tend to specialize by industry, stage of investment, or geographic 
region,94 and are particularly visible in Silicon Valley,95 and in the 
technology96 and pharmaceutical industries.97  For example, Google, 
Facebook, and FedEx were all venture-backed companies.98  
                                                                                                             
in 1987 were structured as limited partnerships.").  
86See id. (describing the structure of venture capital firms).  
87Id. at 490.  
88See id. Some VC funds establish advisory boards, which may have limited partner 
representation.  Sahlman, supra note 9, at 493.  Some also have boards solely made up of limited 
partners.  Id.  But see Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the 
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1088 (2003) (characterizing advisory committees 
as "largely inconsequential"). 
89Sahlman, supra note 9, at 492.  
90Id. at 491 (referring to this arrangement as a "takedown schedule"). 
91Id. (explaining how the limited partner may lose one-half of her capital account and thus 
one-half of the profits that would have been designated to her).    
92See Harris, supra note 84, at 262 & fig. 1.  
93Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 2309. 
94Sahlman, supra note 9, at 489. 
95Emilio J. Castilla, Networks of Venture Capital Firms in Silicon Valley, 25 INT'L J. TECH. 
MGMT. 113, 115 (2003), http://web.mit.edu/ecastill/www/publications/Castilla (IJTM2003).pdf 
("West Coast venture capitalists have helped make Silicon Valley the focus of world attention and 
the cradle of technology-based entrepreneurship.").  
96Id.  
97Jessica Leber, Merck Looks to Startups, MIT TECH. REV. (June 1, 2012) 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428064/merck-looks-to-startups/ ("The multinational 
drug giants [e.g. Merck, Eli Lilly, and GlaxoSmithKline] are moving to partner with venture-capital 
firms and nascent biotechnology companies in hopes of feeding their drug development pipelines.").  
98See SVB Fin. Grp., Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in and 
Relationships with Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, at 10 http://www.federalreserve.gove/ 
SECRS/2012/March/20120322/R-1432/R-1432_021312_105539_ 519233900450_1.pdf.  
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Most VC firms are management companies that oversee several 
different VC funds, where each is a separate limited partnership.99  Kleiner 
Perkins, Sequoia, and Benchmark are generally considered the dominant 
firms, but there are over 842 firms managing over 1,274 funds today.100  
Individual VC funds have a lifespan of about ten years.101  After the end of 
legal existence, all assets are distributed.102  With such a limited time 
horizon, reputation matters.103  If a fund is successful, the managers can 
capitalize on the reputation of their prior achievements, and generate larger 
follow-on funds.104 
There is substantial literature focusing on the compensation of VC 
managers.105  The goal is to align the managers' incentives appropriately, so 
they maximize their investors' profit.106  Ordinarily, GPs receive an annual 
management fee ranging from 2 to 2.5% of committed capital.107  Most of 
their compensation, however, comes from the share of the profits they 
receive, known as "carried interest" or "carry."108  The industry norm is for 
VC managers to receive 20% of the venture funds' realized profits, which is 
taxed (controversially) at the preferential 15% capital gains rate.109  Most 
 
                                                                                                             
99Sahlman, supra note 9, at 488. 
100See Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77, 101 (2005) 
(referring to Kleiner Perkins, Sequoia, and Benchmark as the "royalty of Silicon valley"); National 
Venture Capital Association Yearbook 2012, supra note 79, at 9.  
101Sahlman, supra note 9, at 490.  Almost all permit extension, some requiring the consent 
of limited partners, although 48% leave it to the general partner's discretion.  Id.  
102Id.  
103See generally Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, What Drives Venture Capital 
Fundraising? 12-13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6906, Jan. 1999) 
[hereinafter Gompers & Lerner, What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?] (stating that a fund's 
size and age can be indicia of its reputation).   
104See id. ("Older and larger venture organizations are likely to have more established 
reputation.  They may therefore receive larger capital commitments than similar younger funds.").  
105See, e.g., Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements, supra note 9, at 169 
(stating that management's compensation is an out-of-pocket expense for the investor, and is 
usually tacked onto the investor's capital commitment).  
106See, e.g., Sahlman, supra note 9, at 494 (describing the system worked out by fund 
manager and investor regarding management's compensation as "critical . . . in aligning the 
interests" between the two parties).  
107See Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements, supra note 9, at 173. 
108See Sahlman, supra note 9, at 492.  
109See id. at 491 ("In 88% of the funds surveyed, venture capitalists are entitled to 20% of 
the realized gains on the fund.  In the remaining partnerships, the general partner's share of realized 
gains ranges from 15% to 30%.  Given the diversity of fund organizers and their differing stated 
purposes, this seems remarkably consistent . . . ."); Gompers & Lerner, Analysis of Compensation, 
supra note 9, at 6 (stating that, in addition to a fixed annual fee, the venture capitalist usually 
receives 20% of the fund's profits); Note, Taxing Partnership Profits Interests: The Carried Interest 
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funds specify the percentage of time that VCs must devote to management.110 
They also limit the amount of money that can be invested in any one 
portfolio company.111  VC fund managers also provide about 1% of the 
capital raised in venture funds—the "skin in the game" that ensures they 
suffer some downside risk.112   
In sum, the VC contractual design features limited life113 and incentive 
compensation in the form of 20% of the profits coupled with personal 
investment.114  Given that the venture capital world is limited to a relatively 
small number of institutions, investors, and managers, reputation figures 
highly on both sides of the contract.115  Investors have no voice in individual 
investment decisions, and while in theory they stage their investment, in 
practice investors tend to follow through with their funding promises.116  We 
see this model largely recapitulated in LBO funds. 
B.  Private Equity/LBO 
Unlike VC funds, which invest in a portion of pre-IPO firms, LBO 
firms focus on acquiring outright mature companies that produce a steady 
stream of income, in excess of required expenditures.117  This "free cash 
flow" presents a high risk of agency cost—a constant influx of money that 
tempts managers to slack or spend on perquisites rather than using the 
money as principals would want.118  Advocates of LBOs argue that they solve 
the free cash flow problem by purchasing the company essentially by 
                                                                                                             
Problem, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1774 (2011) ("[P]rivate equity GPs are taxed at long-term 
capital gains rates as low as 15% on partnership profits allocated to a carried interest, while the same 
amount of compensation structured as a salary would be taxed at ordinary income rates as high as 
35%.").  GPs also may receive early distributions.  Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership 
Agreements, supra note 9, at 163 (characterizing part of managerial compensation as an interest-free 
loan, which can give the managers a higher return than the nominal carry percentage).  
110Sahlman, supra note 9, at 492.   
111Id. at 496-99. 
112Sahlman, supra note 9, at 488; Fleischer, supra note 38, at 8 ("The GP . . . contributes 
some of its own capital to the fund so that it has some 'skin in the game.'  This amount ranges from 
one to five percent of the total amount in the fund.").  The 1% contribution helps to assure a 
"favorable tax treatment."  Sahlman, supra note 9, at 490.  Sometimes this contribution comes in the 
form of a promissory note instead of cash.  Id.    
113See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.  
114See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.  
115See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.  
116See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.  
117Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 121.  
118See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986). 
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mortgage, using the company itself as collateral.119  The company is thus 
highly leveraged, and the theory is that the need for regular repayments of 
the loan soaks up the excess cash flow and enforces discipline on the 
company,120 which pays off its debt and then is generally resold to the public 
leaner and more valuable than pre-LBO.121  Many LBO firms now specialize 
in certain industries.122  Top names in the field include KKR, the Carlyle 
Group, and Blackstone.123   
Leveraged buyouts of public companies rose to prominence in the 
1980s—financed by the junk bond industry—and waned in the 1990s.124  
Private equity funds, however, were still purchasing private companies.125  
In the mid-2000s, LBOs of public companies once again became popular 
and reached a fever-pitch before the financial crisis of 2008.126  As we will 
see, SPACs formed as a part of the acquisitive activity of this time, bidding 
side-by-side with their private equity cousins.127  By 2009, private equity 
funds managed $1 trillion of capital worldwide.128  In 2010, buyout activity 
totaled $221 billion (consisting of over 2,000 deals).129   
Even while focusing on a different investment sector, LBO funds 
share many features in common with venture funds.  Like VC funds, buyout 
funds are almost all organized as limited partnerships, with the firm serving 
as the GP of each fund, and outside investors serving as LPs.130  A private 
 
                                                                                                             
119See, e.g, Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 131 ("Leverage creates pressure on 
managers not to waste money, because they must make interest and principal payments.  This 
pressure reduces the 'free cash flow' problem[] . . . .").  
120See Jensen, supra note 118, at 324 ("By issuing debt in exchange for stock, managers 
are bonding their promise to pay out future cash flows in a way that cannot be accomplished by 
simple dividend increases. . . .  [D]ebt reduces the agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the 
cash flow available for spending at the discretion of managers.").  
121See id. at 328-29 (describing how under "free cash flow theory," when debt is used 
properly, "a much leaner and competitive organization results").   
122Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 132.  
123Id. at 123. 
124Id. at 121-22; see also Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles and 
the Distribution of Income, 30 B.U. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 237-38 (describing how in the 
1980s, LBOs were financed by issuing "high yield bonds" [a.k.a. "junk bonds"]).  
125Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 122.  
126Id.  
127See Davidoff, supra note 4, at 226 ("With the increasing prominence of private equity, 
the growth of SPACs has also accelerated.").  
128Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 2303.  
129Paul J. Shim, Private Equity M&A Recent Developments 2011, in MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS 2011: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW NOW, at 347 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Series No. 29607, 2011). 
130Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 123; see also Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 
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equity firm generally organizes multiple funds.131  Investors include 
pension funds, endowments, insurance companies, and wealthy individual 
investors.132  Private-equity funds, like VC funds, generally offer to sell only 
to accredited investors.133   
Funds have a fixed life, generally ten years, with extensions of up to 
three years being possible.134  Generally investments in companies occur in 
the first five years of the fund's life.135  One study found that LBO funds 
made a median of twelve investments.136  Generally fund investors have 
"little say" in the fund's investments.137  Sometimes there are limits on the 
types of securities in which a fund can invest, and on the level of debt a fund 
can take on.138     
Early exit is difficult.  As Professor James C. Spindler posited: 
The limited partners generally cannot withdraw their money 
and are dependent upon the general partner to make 
distributions.  While there is the possibility of selling the 
limited partnership interest to someone else, there are often 
significant impediments to doing so.  The first, and most 
important, is that in many agreements, such a sale will often 
require the permission of the general partner.  The general 
partner can simply say no.139  
Even without a GP veto, a market for lemons problem arises:  why would an 
LP sell if the investment was a valuable one?140   
                                                                                                             
2304 ("Virtually all private equity funds are organized as limited partnerships."). 
131Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 2304. 
132Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 123. 
133See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1961, 2037 n.413 (2010) (stating that the author's proposal could be applied to 
investment funds which "have traditionally been restricted to accredited investors"); James C. 
Spindler, How Private Is Private Equity, and at What Cost?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 325 (2009) 
(describing how private equity funds avoid SEC disclosure requirements by "limit[ing] its offering 
to accredited investors only, rather than, say, placing ads in the newspaper the way that a mutual 
fund might do").  
134Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 123. 
135See, e.g., id. (stating that the first five years of the fund's life are spent investing, while 
the remaining five years are spent trying to pay back investors).  
136Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 2309. 
137Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 123 ("After committing their capital, the limited 
partners have little say in how the general partner deploys the investment funds, as long as the 
basic covenants of the fund agreement are followed.").  
138Id.  
139Spindler, supra note 133, at 330. 
140Id. at 330-31.  
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As with venture capital, the fund manager receives an annual 
management fee from investors, generally a percentage of the capital 
committed.141  The more significant form of compensation is a share of the 
profits, which is "almost always" 20%.142  Variations in the payout can occur. 
 For example, sometimes the fund must return a preset percentage (called the 
"hurdle") before any money can be distributed to the GP;143 however, VC 
funds do not typically have this feature.144  Sometimes the carried interest can 
be collected early, although there are usually "clawback" provisions that 
allow the outside investors to reclaim some of their money if the fund's 
overall returns fall short.145  In a departure from the venture model, some 
GPs charge deal fees or monitoring fees to their portfolio companies.146  
Usually the manager invests at least 1% of her own capital in the fund, 
which some financial contracting scholars suggest is merely a product of 
bygone tax law.147  The SPAC experience may suggest that the personal 
investment of managers is more important than the literature implies.148  As 
Part VI will show, SPAC managers initially contributed little of their own 
money to their fund, but were soon expected to put some "skin in the game." 
One key additional discipline that does not apply to venture capitalists 
operates on buyout fund managers.  Buyout funds must seek outside 
capital—in the form of loans from financial institutions—before each 
 
                                                                                                             
141See Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 2309-10 ("Historically, the most common 
method was to assess fees as a constant percentage of committed capital.  For example, if a fund 
charges 2% annual management fees on committed capital for ten years, then the lifetime fees of the 
ten-year fund would be 20% of committed capital, with investment capital comprising the other 
80%.  In recent years, many funds have adopted a decreasing fee schedule, with the percentage 
falling after the investment period.  For example, a fund might have a 2% fee during five-year 
investment period, with this annual fee falling by 25 basis points per year for the next five years."). 
142Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 124; see also Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 
2311 ("The overwhelming majority of funds—including all 144 BO funds—use 20% as their carry 
level.  Among the ninety-four VC funds, one has a carry level of 17.5%, three have carry levels of 
25%, and one has a carry level of 30%.  The exact origin of the 20% focal point is unknown, but 
previous authors have pointed to Venetian merchants in the Middle Ages, speculative sea voyages 
in the age of exploration, and even the book of Genesis as sources.") (footnote omitted).   
143Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 2310. 
144See Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements, supra note 9, at 165.    
145Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 9, at 2312-13. 
146Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 124. 
147See id. ("It is customary for the general partner to provide at least 1 percent of the total 
capital.").  Professor Victor Fleischer calls this an "artifact of tax history."  Fleischer, supra note 
100, at 82.  "Before the check-the-box rules, a 1% capital interest was necessary to help ensure 
partnership classification for tax purposes."  Id. at 82 n.25.  
148See infra Part VI.  
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investment in a portfolio company.149  This external check on managerial 
discretion might serve some of the function of staged commitment in VC 
funds—if the acquisition is a lousy one, then no bank will fund it, and it will 
not go through.150   
C.  Reputation 
One final non-contractual and difficult-to-quantify element of the 
relationship between managers and investors merits our attention: 
reputation.151  In a foundational article on venture capital, Professor Ron 
Gilson describes the "braiding" of the reputational market.152  The point is an 
elegant one:  the long-term relationship between investor and manager 
comforts the entrepreneur who fears opportunistic behavior from the VC.153 
In order to explain the nature of the "braiding" of the two contracts, 
we must explain how private equity's business model depends on scale and 
scope economies.154  Professor William A. Sahlman explains that in venture 
capital both scale and scope economies exist.155  Since "rent, information 
acquisition, accounting, and certain legal costs" are fixed, creating a large 
 
                                                                                                             
149See, e.g., Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 124 ("The buyout is typically financed 
with 60 to 90 percent debt—hence the term, leveraged buyout.  The debt almost always includes a 
loan portion that is senior and secured, and is arranged by a bank or an investment bank.").  Hedge 
funds can also buy this debt from the banks and then resell it.  Id.  Also, "mezzanine debt" (or junior 
debt) can also own some portion of the fund's financing.  Id. at 124-25.  
150See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
289, 299 (2009) ("[M]arket scrutiny of individual deals through ex post debt financing reduce 
limited partners' need to vote on or seek judicial review of the fund's investments."). 
151See generally Gilson, supra note 88, at 1092 (introducing a theory of reputation and 
"braiding").  
152See id.  
 153According to Gilson's theory, the contracts between the fund's investors and managers 
and between the fund's managers and the target entrepreneurs are "braided" together because of 
reputation.  Id.  The manager-entrepreneur contract cedes power over to the managers; however 
managers have an incentive to not act badly or else other entrepreneurs will not want to deal with 
them in the future.  Id.  The investor-manager contract encourages managers to have this 
control.  Gilson, supra note 88, at 1092.  Therefore, the contracts are "braided" because reputation 
and behavior in one contractual relationship influences and is influenced by the other.  See id.    
154See Sahlman, supra note 9, at 500 ("Scale economies exist if the unit cost of production 
and distribution of a product or service declines as volume increases.  In the venture-capital 
organization, production and distribution encompass raising capital, finding and structuring deals, 
monitoring the investments, and distributing the proceeds.  Scope economies exist if unit costs 
decline if multiple products or services are produced simultaneously (for example, if more than one 
fund is managed at a time).  Learning-curve effects exist if the unit cost of a process declines over 
time with accumulated volume.").  
155See id. at 500-01.  
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fund is not that much more expensive than a small fund156 – both require the 
same kind of institutional knowledge, deal flow, contacts, and 
relationships.157  Operating different funds within the same family creates 
scope economies.  Again, cost does not rise in a linear fashion, so successful 
managers can trade on their deal-making reputation and increase returns.158  
Two additional benefits exist: "[f]irst, keeping the venture-capital 
management company in existence preserves the learning that has taken 
place.  Second, managing multiple funds takes advantage of any scale or 
scope economies.  From 1977 to 1988, new funds averaged less than one-
half the size of follow-on funds."159  Reacting to this natural tendency, 
sometimes VC funds restrict their managers from raising new funds until a 
given date or a set percentage has been invested.160 
The desirability of scale and scope economies creates an emphasis on 
reputation that has ripple effects for both targets and fund investors.161  As an 
illustration, suppose Emma Entrepreneur is considering allowing Venture 
Fund to buy a portion of her company.  She has no prior experience with 
Venture Fund, and this is her first entrepreneurial endeavor.  Accepting the 
proposed investment is risky because she must cede control to an outside 
investor with whom she has had no prior dealings, and she rightfully fears 
opportunism.  But Venture Fund's particular portfolio investments are 
"braided" with the reputation of the fund's managers for selecting deserving 
companies and nurturing them to successful outcomes.162  If Venture Fund 
treats Emma's company poorly, then it will be more difficult for it to find 
companies willing to accept its money in the future.  A bad enough 
reputation among would-be portfolio companies will jeopardize its ability to 
raise the future funds that are critical to its business model.163  
 
                                                                                                             
156See id. at 500.   
157See Joshua Lerner, The Syndication of Venture Capital Investments, 23 FIN. MGMT. 16, 
20 (1994) ("More established venture organizations should be able to access capital from investors 
for larger and more frequent funds.  Venture capitalists generally prefer larger funds because of the 
substantial economies of scale in operating a large venture fund (or several large funds).").  
158Sahlman, supra note 9, at 500-01 (describing how, once scale or scope economies are 
met, if costs continue to go down, a "learning curve" is being met in which "[t]he venture-capital 
organization develops a reputation that has economic value").   
159Id. at 501 (citation omitted).  
160Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture 
Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & Econ. 463, 482 (1996) [hereinafter Gompers & Lerner, The Use 
of Covenants].  
161See Gompers & Lerner, What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?, supra note 103, at 
28-29 (implying that a venture fund's size is tied to reputation).  
162See Gilson, supra note 88, at 1092.  
163See id. (describing how "braiding" functions in the reputation market). 
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The literature on reputational effects in LBO funds is less robust, but 
reputation remains a matter of concern.164  Various scholars have argued that 
these funds are mindful of their reputation when invoking contractual rights 
to walk away from a deal.165  However, reputation for successful investments 
clearly matters as well.166 
III.  SPACS 
The reader is now familiar with the general contours of private equity 
funds.  Patterns emerge: a limited partnership with no investor say in 
individual portfolio investments;167  compensation consisting of a modest 
management fee and incentive compensation entitling managers to 20% of 
the fund profits;168  accredited investors—wealthy individuals and large 
institutional players169—who make illiquid investments, protected principally 
by a ten-year term investment, which can be extended, but not by much.170  
Staged investment is common in venture funds, and in buyout funds the 
necessity of third-party capital for each investment functions in a similar 
way, offering a kind of mid-term examination of managerial performance.171   
What if we change the parameters of the investment?  Specifically, 
what if the investment is liquid—publicly traded, in fact—so that non-
accredited mom-and-pop investors can participate?  What if they can pull 
their money out after committing it?  What if investors are allowed a voice 
on individual investment?  SPACs tell the story of such an experiment.   
 
                                                                                                             
164See, e.g., Cem Demiroglu & Christopher M. James, The Role of Private Equity Group 
Reputation in LBO Financing, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 306, 308 (2010) ("[Private Equity Group] 
reputation may be related to the structure of LBO financing.").  
165See, e.g., Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse 
Termination Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1186 n.99 (citing Demiroglu & James, supra note 164, 
at 310) ("Private equity firms may have an incentive to achieve a high reputation by investing their 
committed capital and completing acquisition deals.  This commitment to completing transactions 
may be beneficial to the private equity firm in a number of ways.  A recent study by Demiroglu and 
James found that LBOs initiated by private equity firms with good reputation typically pay narrower 
loan spreads, have fewer, less restrictive loan covenants, utilize less traditional bank debt, and 
borrow more at a lower cost from institutional loan markets."); Davidoff, supra note 72, at 502-03.   
166See Christopher W. Kirkham & Jennifer M. Taylor, Working Through a Workout: A 
Practitioner's Guide from the Perspective of Private Equity Sponsors, Venture Capital Funds and 
Other Significant Equity Investors, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 355, 360 (2009).  
167See supra notes 85-89, 130 and accompanying text.  
168See supra notes 107-09, 141-42 and accompanying text.  
169See supra notes 81-83, 132-33 and accompanying text.   
170See supra notes 101-02, 134-35 and accompanying text.   
171See notes 90-91, 149-50 and accompanying text.  
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A.  Introduction to the Form 
A SPAC is born when a group of founders, known as sponsors, 
incorporate a "blank check" company:  a shell company with no assets or 
operating history.172  They then take the company public with the promise 
that they will soon attempt to complete an acquisition of a target (generally, 
but not always, private) using various bonding mechanisms to assure 
investors that their money will not be misapplied.173  Most notably, the bulk 
of the offering proceeds must be escrowed in a trust account, and are only 
released upon completion of the acquisition.174  Going public is a relatively 
cheap proposition because, unlike the typical initial public offering, there is 
very little for the SPAC to disclose.175  The SPAC investor is essentially 
buying a management team.176  Once the managers identify a target, the 
SPAC shareholders may vote against the acquisition and receive their money 
back, or maintain their investment and become shareholders of the newly 
acquired company.177    
A typical SPAC is a unit offering, that is, a combination of stock 
shares and warrants to purchase shares.178  Sponsors (the SPAC's founders) 
initially buy a small number of shares at a low valuation.179  These shares are 
escrowed.180  If a deal goes through, they are released from escrow, and 
sponsors wind up owning 20% of the post-acquisition company.181 If no 
business combination occurs, the sponsors receive nothing for their escrowed 
shares; they do not participate in any liquidation distribution.182   
 
                                                                                                             
172Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 756.  
173See Davidoff, supra note 4, at 224-25.  
174See id. ("During this interim period [before the acquistion(s)], the proceeds of the initial 
public offering are held in a trust or escrow account.").   
175See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 757 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 230.419 (2007)) (describing how a 
SPAC, unlike a normal corporation, avoids application of SEC Rule 419).  
176Because the SPAC has no assets, other than the potential to make valuable acquisitions 
and business decisions, the investor is essentially investing solely in the SPAC's management.  See 
Davidoff, supra note 4, at 224 & n.170.   
177See id. at 225 (stating that proposed acquisitions are put to an investor vote, and that if an 
investor "vote[s] against it and follow[s] certain perfection procedures they are entitled to redeem 
their shares for a pro rata share of the remaining offering proceeds held in trust").  
178Riemer, supra note 45, at 952.   
179Id. at 959.  
180Id.   
181See id. at 959 & n.187.  
182Riemer, supra note 45, at 959 & n.188.  
872 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 37 
 
 
After the IPO, the SPAC searches for a target.183  In contrast to the 
typical public company, SPAC officers and directors are generally not 
obligated to devote all of their time to running the SPAC.184  Officers and 
directors are often reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses incurred in 
connection with identifying businesses and performing due diligence,185 but 
generally receive no salary or fees until after the initial business combination 
occurs.186 
The announcement of a proposed acquisition heralds a SPAC's end 
game.187  Most SPACs give stockholders a chance to vote on the 
acquisition.188  SPACs sometimes repurchase shares, bargaining for a 
positive vote on an acquisition in exchange for the promise to buy shares 
once the acquisition is completed.189  There have also been reports of hedge 
funds "greenmailing" SPACs in exchange for a positive vote (i.e., requiring 
additional consideration in exchange for a "yes" vote),190 which has 
prompted the development of a new generation of SPACs, described in Part 
VII.  If the business combination is voted down, the money from the trust is 
distributed to the shareholders.191  If the combination is approved, the newly 
 
                                                                                                             
183Id. at 950 ("[SPACs] are incorporated with the sole objective of raising funds for an 
acquisition through a public offering of their securities.").  
184See, e.g., Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 12 (Aug. 31, 
2005) ("We do not intend to have any full time employees prior to the consummation of a business 
combination.  Each of our executive officers are engaged in several other business endeavors and 
are not obligated to contribute any specific number of hours per week to our affairs."). 
185See, e.g., Bank St. Telecom Funding Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 17 
(Aug. 5, 2005) ("[E]ach of our directors may receive reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses 
incurred by them in connection with activities on our behalf such as identifying potential target 
businesses and performing due diligence on suitable business combinations . . . ."). 
186See, e.g., HCM Acquisition Co., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 84 (Oct. 10, 
2007) ("[N]o officers or directors will receive compensation prior to [the firm's] initial business 
combination . . . ."); Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1, supra note 184, at 2.  
187See Riemer, supra note 45, at 950 (stating that only after securing a merger or 
acquisition with a private company will a SPAC turn its attention to conducting business for profit).  
188See id. at 952 (explaining how the SPAC shareholder vote works).  
189See Steven M. Davidoff, Behind the Re-Emergence of SPACS, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK 
(Oct. 21, 2009, 3:27 PM ), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/10/21/behind-the-re-emergence-of-
spacs/ (describing how one SPAC [GHL Acquisition Corporation] entered into a repurchase 
agreement with its investors in order to secure a vote whereby the SPAC purchased 32% of the 
investors' shares for more than they were worth and gave up some of its own shares).  
190Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to the Special Purpose Acquisition Company 
Listing Standards, Exchange Act Release No. 34-63607, 2010 WL 5301044, at *5 (Dec. 23, 2010) 
[hereinafter Order].  
191See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 45, at 954-55 tbl. 1 (explaining that in a SPAC, a successful 
acquisition requires shareholder majority vote and that the escrowed funds are returned unless a 
successful acquisition occurs).  
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acquired target begins trading publicly, often under a new symbol.192  SPACs 
often use stock to purchase targets, reserving the cash in the trust account for 
possible redemptions and perhaps to finance the operations of the target.193  
Indeed, corporate disclosures often draw attention to the existence of 
authorized, but unissued, shares that may be used for a combination, 
thereby diluting existing shareholders.194  Post-acquisition, sponsor shares are 
often subject to a lock-up period.195 
No special legislation or administrative rules govern SPACs.196  The 
bonding mechanisms that SPAC sponsors use to gain the trust of investors 
are relatively simple, and largely track the requirements of SEC Rule 419, 
even though SPACs are specifically structured to avoid the terms of that 
regulation.197  Their relative freedom from regulation enables SPACs to 
innovate quickly.198  Indeed, as long as SPAC organizers can persuade the 
 
                                                                                                             
192See Michael J. De La Merced, Tile Shop to Go Public in Merger with "Blank Check" 
Company, DEALBOOK (June 27, 2012, 10:24 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/tile-
shop-to-go-public-in-merger-with-blank-check-company/ ("[SPACs] raise money from public 
investors and exist as thinly traded shell companies, which look to invest in privately held 
corporations that would assume their stock ticker symbol.").  
193Order, supra note 190, 2010 WL 5301044, at *3.  
194See, e.g., Bank St. Telecom Funding Corp., Form S-1, supra note 185, at 16-17 ("In 
connection with this offering, as part of the units, we [the SPAC] will be issuing warrants to 
purchase 11,000,000 shares of common stock. . . .  If and to the extent these warrants are exercised, 
you [new investors] may experience dilution to your holdings."); see also Mark A. Bonenfant, 
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, BUCHALTER NEMER PC (Dec. 1, 2007), http://www.buc 
halter.com/bt/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=239&Itemid=1 (stating that one of the 
problems in SPACs is that "management receives 20% of the SPAC equity to find a deal, diluting 
the public shareholders").  
195See, e.g., HCM Acquisition Co., Form S-1, supra note 186, at 1; see also Legal Alert: 
The SPAC Phenomenon: A Discussion of the Background, Structure and Recent Developments 
Involving Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP, 7 (July 
17, 2006), http://www.sutherland.com/files/News/74ae02a0-d2b5-42cb-9655-93110fc3be4f 
/Presentation/NewsAttachment/deb8e907-69d8-43d5-a6d0-8814b81cf32a/The%20SPAC%20 Phen 
omenin%20-%20A%20Discussion%20of%20the%20Background,%20Structure%20and% 20Recent 
%20Developments%20Involving%20S.pdf (defining a "lock-up agreement" as one in which the 
SPAC's sponsors, in the post-acquisition phase, agree to not sell their shares for a specified time 
period).  
196See Riemer, supra note 45, at 933 (describing how SPACs are "no more regulated than 
traditional public offerings").  
197See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 757-58 (describing how a SPAC avoids application of 
Rule 419 because its IPO well surpasses the amount necessary to be considered a "blank check 
company" by the SEC, but nevertheless mimics some of Rule 419's requirements so that investors 
will want to join the enterprise).  
198See Riemer, supra note 45, at 965 ("Permitting SPACs to continue operating without 
additional regulation will allow the SPAC structure to remain dynamic and adaptive.").  
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SEC to acquiesce, changes can occur in a matter of months.199  Because of 
the uniquely uniform structure of the underlying business (essentially an 
empty shell), we are able to compare SPACs' voting schemes, investor 
protections, and outcomes, free from the confounding variables (e.g., 
differing industry types, capital structure) of the typical IPO.200   
In a nutshell, SPACs can be seen as a tidy solution to the problem of 
the high cost of accessing the public markets.201  They create value for a 
variety of market participants.202  To retail investors they provide a sort of 
poor man's private equity fund—a chance to finance a crack management 
team's hunt for an undervalued private company and get in on the cheap.203  
They allow a management team to raise funds from the public to finance the 
quest for a target.204  Finally, they give existing companies another path to 
liquidity and the capital markets, allowing them to bypass the costly process 
of going public while maintaining their autonomy in a way they could not if 
acquired by private equity or a strategic acquirer.205  
We find that a number of contractual constraints that were attractive to 
initial SPAC investors made the ultimate acquisition more difficult, and 
therefore evolved over time.206  In particular, a provision that granted 20% of 
shares an effective veto over the acquisition created the potential for holdup 
that hedge fund arbitrageurs learned to exploit.207  Recognition of this cost 
 
                                                                                                             
199See id. (describing how, presently, SPACs have presented no legal problems and how, 
therefore, their "innovation and creativity" should be left alone to thrive); see also Jayson Caruso, 
Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) Funding Opportunities, EVANCARMICHAEL.COM, 
http://www.evancarmichael.com/Small-Business-Loans/571/SPECIAL-PURPOSE-ACQUISITION-
-COMPANY-SPAC---FUNDING-OPPORTUNITIES.html ("SPACs . . . raise money faster than 
private equity funds.").  
200See Riemer, supra note 45, at 933 & n.11 (describing the essential emptiness of a SPAC).  
201Id. at 966 ("SPACs are uniquely situated to take companies public that otherwise could 
not.").  
202See id. ("While the fraudulent blank checks offerings of the 1980s destroyed capital, 
SPACs make a positive contribution to domestic capital formation.").  
203See, e.g., id. (explaining how SPACs can offer advantages that traditional private 
equity cannot).  
204See Riemer, supra note 45, at 966 ("SPACs present investors with the unique 
opportunity to invest in a management team with a proven track record and to participate in a 
private-equity style venture in a safer and more liquid manner.").  
205See id. (describing how a SPAC provides a small private firm a pathway to a public 
exchange of its shares).  
206See Order, supra note 190, 2010 WL 5301044, at *5.  
207See id. at *5-*7 (explaining the problem of "greenmailing"); see also Joseph R. Magnas, 
A New SPAC Structure May Lead to Renewed Interest in SPAC Offerings, 5 BLOOMBERG LAW 
REPORTS—MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 1, 3 (8th ed. 2011), available at http://www.mofo.com/ 
files/Uploads/Images/110401-A-New-SPAC-Structure-May-Lead-to-Renewed-Interest-in-SPAC-
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has recently led to major changes in the ability of shareholders to 
disapprove of a proposed business combination, ultimately resulting in the 
loss of the vote entirely.208  But before one can appreciate the rapid changes 
the SPAC has undergone, one must understand its origins.      
B.  How SPACs Developed 
SPACs' precursors were blank check companies that sprang up in the 
1980s under the somewhat unseemly circumstances associated with "pump-
and-dump" schemes.209  A blank check company is one whose stated purpose 
is to merge with a yet-to-be-identified target.210  Most of the blank check 
company's stock would be distributed to the underwriter and its associates 
and, in problematic cases, the brokerage would disseminate false reports 
about a profitable upcoming merger, thereby "pumping up" the stock.211  The 
insiders would then "dump" the stock, leaving it virtually worthless when the 
vaunted merger failed to materialize.212 
The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act 
of 1990 largely shut down these fraudulent blank check companies of the 
1980s.213  This Act required the SEC to promulgate rules regarding blank 
check companies.214  The SEC responded with Rule 419, which defines a 
blank check company as one that:  
(i) Is a development stage company that has no specific 
business plan or purpose or has indicated that its business plan 
is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified 
company or companies, or other entity or person; and 
                                                                                                             
Offerings.pdf ("[T]he charter documents of many SPACs formed prior to 2010 provide that the 
SPACs may not complete an acquisition if holders of a fixed number of the outstanding shares of 
common stock (generally 20% to 30%) vote against the acquisition.").  
208See infra Part VII.A.  
209See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 756 & n.87 (describing how the "pump and dump" 
schemes led to new federal laws).  
210See id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 617, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1990)) (defining "blank 
check company").  
211See id. at 756 n.87 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 617) (describing how defrauders "pump up" 
the stock by lying about its value to potential investors).  
212See id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 617) (describing how after the price has risen, 
defrauders then "unload" their shares).  
213See Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, §§ 501-510, 104 Stat. 931, 
951-58 (1990). 
214Riemer, supra note 45, at 941-42.  
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(ii) Is issuing "penny stock," as defined in Rule 3a51-1 (17 
C.F.R. 240.3a51-1) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
("Exchange Act").215 
Penny stock is in turn defined as stock that has a price of less than $4 
per share, and whose company market value is less than $5 million, among 
other criteria.216 
A little more than a decade after the passage of the Penny Stock 
Reform Act, a banker named David Nussbaum217 created a new business 
form that melded the basic structure of the blank check company with the 
protective principles of Rule 419.218  He introduced the form in the 1990s, 
and twelve of his thirteen SPACs went public and completed acquisitions 
during that period—all relatively small-scale.219  With the internet bubble of 
the late 1990s, it became easy for private companies simply to go public on 
their own, and the form was abandoned.220   
SPACs avoid the reach of Rule 419 because, although their business 
plan involves a future unidentified merger, they do not issue penny stock; if 
their IPO is successful, the proceeds are comfortably over the $5 million 
threshold, and always priced higher than $4 per share.221  The requirements 
of Rule 419 are still worth describing, however, because SPACs track many 
of them.222  Rule 419 requires that the securities offered in connection with a 
blank check offering, and the gross proceeds of the offering, be deposited 
into an escrow account (after deductions for underwriting 
commissions, expenses, and dealer allowances) and invested in liquid 
government-backed securities.223  It requires that interest on these funds also 
 
                                                                                                             
21517 C.F.R. §§ 230.419(a)(2)(i)-(ii) (2011). 
216Id. § 240.3a51-1(a). 
217See Riemer, supra note 45, at 931 n.5, 945.  Nussbaum at the time headed GKN 
Securities Corporation, but left it to found EarlyBirdCapital, Inc., which we study in Part VII.C.  
See id. at 931 n.5, 948 n.110.  
218Id. at 945-46.   
219See id. at 945-47.  
220See Riemer, supra note 45, at 946.  
221See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 757-58 ("[P]ost-IPO, SPACs easily exceed the $5,000,000 
net tangible assets threshold given they have no operations and therefore minimal liabilities.").  
222See id. at 758 ("Although SPACs are exempt from Rule 419 compliance, they 
nonetheless voluntarily incorporate a number of Rule 419-type provisions in their IPO terms in 
order to attract investors.").  
223See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.419(b)(2)(i)-(iv) (2011) (requiring offering proceeds to be invested 
in a "deposit," as defined in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act; in "[s]ecurities of any open-end 
investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940; or [in] . . . [s]ecurities 
that are direct obligations of, or obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by, the United 
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be held in an escrow or trust account, and provides that the company may 
receive up to 10% of the proceeds remaining after expenses are 
deducted.224  The funds are released upon execution of an agreement for the 
acquisition of a business or line of businesses where the fair value 
represents at least 80% of the maximum offering proceeds.225  Importantly, 
under Rule 419, shares do not trade on the open market until the 
acquisition.226  The company must disclose: (1) the financial statements of 
the company and target, (2) the amount of gross offering proceeds, (3) the 
amount paid for underwriting, (4) the amount remaining in the trust account, 
and (5) the amount, use, and application of the funds paid to the company, 
officers, directors, promoters, and controlling shareholders.227  Each 
purchaser then receives a prospectus, and has twenty to forty-five business 
days to notify the company that she chooses to remain an investor; if not, she 
receives back her pro rata share.228  Funds must be returned if no acquisition 
occurs within eighteen months.229  Developers of SPACs purposefully 
modeled their features on Rule 419's protective features, with the key 
distinction that the stock would trade as soon as the vehicle went public.230 
Some readers may associate SPACs with the reverse mergers that have 
recently made headlines.231  Reverse mergers, however, are a different 
animal.  In a typical reverse merger, a corporation looking to go public on 
the cheap merges with a publicly traded shell corporation—an entity that, for 
example, previously sold all of its assets but remained publicly traded.232  
Several Chinese companies went public by being acquired via reverse 
merger and were subsequently revealed to have questionable accounting 
practices.233  SPACs, in contrast, disclose material information about the 
                                                                                                             
States"). 
224Id. §§ 230.419(b)(2)(v)-(vi).  
225Id. § 230.419(e)(1).  
226Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 757 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 230.419(b)(3)) ("Rule                      
419 . . . [p]rohibits trading of the [blank check company's] securities by requiring them to be held 
in an escrow or trust account until consummation of an acquisition . . . .").   
22717 C.F.R. § 230.419(e)(1). 
228Id. §§ 230.419(e)(2)(i)-(ii). 
229Id. § 230.419(e)(2)(iv). 
230Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 758.  
231See infra note 234 and accompanying text.  
232See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 743.  
233Nanette Byrnes & Lynnley Browning, Special Report: China's Shortcut to Wall Street, 
REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/us-shell-china-idUSTRE7702S 
520110801; see also Linette Lopez, Listing A Sketchy Chinese Company In The US Sounds Pretty 
Easy, BUSINESSS INSIDER, Dec. 12, 2012, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-
companies-and-reverse-mergers-2012-12. 
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target before acquisition, and the SEC reviews all of these disclosures.234  
One might even consider SPACs to be reverse mergers "done right." 
The second wave of SPACs began in May 2003, when 
EarlyBirdCapital, an investment bank founded by the creator of SPACs, 
David Nussbaum,235  filed an S-1 for a SPAC named Millstream Acquisition 
Corp.236  Millstream went public in August 2003 and acquired 
NationsHealth, LLC in March 2004.237  Thereafter, the number of SPACs 
grew steadily in number until July 1, 2005, when the American Stock 
Exchange ("AMEX") began to list them on its exchange.238  By 2007, SPACs 
made up almost 25% of all U.S. IPOs.239  The New York Stock Exchange 
("NYSE") and NASDAQ allowed SPACs to list in 2008,240 but the financial 
crisis meant that very few SPACs were formed after the second quarter of 
2008.241  The form seemed close to moribund, with no IPOs in all of 2008.242  
 
                                                                                                             
234See Bonenfant, supra note 194, at *2 ("SPAC managements refrain from looking for 
prospective acquisition targets until the IPO is completed, because if a SPAC identifies a target 
prior to filing the registration statement, then the SEC will require the SPAC to disclose significant 
information about the target even though the SPAC and target may not ultimately consummate a 
transaction."). 
235See Management, EARLYBIRDCAPITAL, http://www.earlybirdcapital.com/management. 
html (last visited Oct. 7, 2011) ("Mr. Nussbaum was the innovative force behind the creation of the 
Special Purpose Acquisition Corp. ("SPAC") financing product."); see also supra notes 217-20 and 
accompanying text (describing Mr. Nussbaum and the origins of the SPAC).  
236See MillStream Acquisition Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (May 19, 2003). 
237Edward Mason & Alexander Soule, 'Blank Check' Investment Co. Files for IPO, 
BOSTON BUS. J. (July 11, 2005), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2005/07/11/story4.html; 
Millstream Acquisition Corporation Completes Initial Public Offering, BUSINESSWIRE (Aug. 28, 
2003), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20030828005453/en/ Millstream-Acquisition-
Corporation-Completes-Initial-Public-Offering (stating that Millstream made known on August 28, 
2003 that it had completed its IPO).  
238See James S. Murray, The Regulation and Pricing of Special Purpose Acquisition 
Corporation IPOs 1, 7 (Jan. 24, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1746530.  We found no announcement of a policy change on the 
part of AMEX to permit SPACs; it appears that AMEX simply began to permit them to do so.  See 
id.; American Stock Exchange Lists Units of Courtside Acquisition, PR NEWSWIRE (July 1, 2005), 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/American+Stock+Exchange+ Lists+Units+of+Courtside+Acquisi      
tion...-a0133708234 (listing Courtside Acquisition Corp. as the first SPAC to be listed on AMEX).  
Because Services Acquisition Corporation filed an F-1 as a foreign issuer, it is not included in our 
dataset. 
239Boyer & Baigent, supra note 4, at 8. 
240See Murray, supra note 238, at 1. 
241See Floyd Wittlin & Kristen Ferris, Can the SPAC Make It Back? Structural Changes, 
Including Elimination of the Stockholder Vote to Approve an Initial Acquisition, May Help Renew 
Interest in SPACs, 4 BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS—MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 1 (2010), available 
at http://www.bingham.com/Publications/Files/2010/12/Can-the-SPAC-Make-It-Back-Structural-
Changes-Including-Eliminating-the-Stockholder-Vote-to-Approve-an-Initial-Acquisition-May.  
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In the post-crisis period, SPACs have resurged with twenty-five preliminary 
prospectuses filed in between 2010 through 2011, and eleven IPOs.243  
IV.  A TALE OF THREE SPACS 
Some SPACs succeed—that is, they go public and complete 
acquisitions.244  Others fail to locate a target or, having found one, fail to gain 
shareholder approval.245  Still other SPACs do not even make it to market.246  
Before describing our data, we offer three case studies to give the reader a 
sense of how SPACs work in the real world.  
Filed but failed to go public.  HCM Acquisition Company ("HCM") 
filed its initial registration statement on October 10, 2007.247  It planned to 
sell 25 million units at $10 per unit, for an aggregate of $250 million.248  Its 
prospectus did not single out a particular industry, but rather focused on 
"industries and target businesses in the United States and Europe that may 
provide significant opportunity for growth."249  It proposed to be listed on the 
AMEX.250  Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. was its underwriter.251   
The sole member of HCM's founding stockholder, HCM Acquisition 
Holdings, LLC, was Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland"), 
whose CEO James D. Dondero, was also CEO of the SPAC.252  Highland 
was described as a "manager of assets in niche markets and complex areas 
including distressed investing (predominantly control-oriented), corporate 
credit, real estate, and equities."253  Basically, the SPAC management team 
consisted of Highland people using Highland advisors.254  The SPAC stated:  
"Our investment philosophy will be based on the strategies employed by 
[Highland and its affiliates, or the "Highland Group"] which reflect the 
private equity and control distressed investing experience of its senior 
management."255  It entered into a "right of first review" agreement with 
                                                                                                             
242Id.  
243See Magnas, supra note 207, at 2.  
244See infra notes 298-320.  
245See infra notes 264-97.  
246See infra notes 247-63 and accompanying text.  
247HCM Acquisition Co., Form S-1, supra note 186, at i.   
248Id.   
249Id.   
250Id.    
251HCM Acquisition Co., Form S-1, supra note 186, at 109.   
252Id. at 1.   
253Id.   
254See id. at 1-2.  
255HCM Acquisition Co., Form S-1, supra note 186, at 3. 
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Highland, whereby any business opportunities Highland Group 
encountered valued at $200 million or more would be submitted first to 
HCM.256  Highland and Dondero entered into non-competes, providing they 
would not work with another blank check company.257  Highland was to be 
repaid $200,000 for offering-related and organizational expenses, plus 
$10,000 per month for office space and administrative support.258  The 
prospectus discussed the AMEX requirement that independent directors 
comprise a majority of the board, and it stated that the company had "agreed 
not to enter into our initial business combination with any entity in which 
any of our initial stockholders, officers, directors or the Highland Group or 
its affiliates has a financial interest."259  It filed several amendments, 
including one on November 21, 2007, disclosing forms of stock 
certificates, bylaws, charter, indemnity agreements, and many other 
corporate organizational documents.260  The most recent amendment was on 
May 23, 2008.261  The SPAC ceased making filings, and has never issued 
shares to the public.262  The registration statement has never been withdrawn, 
as was the case for fifty-seven of those ninety-three SPACs that did not go 
public.263 
Went public and liquidated.  Alpha Security Group Corp. ("Alpha 
Security") filed an S-1 on August 31, 2005.264  It hoped to raise $64 million 
by selling 8 million units at $8 a share (warrants exercisable at $6 per 
share).265  Maxim Group, LLC, a small investment bank that was one of the 
pioneers in SPAC offerings, was the underwriter.266  The prospectus 
 
                                                                                                             
256Id. at 4.  
257Id. at 84-85.  
258Id. at 92.  
259HCM Acquisition Co., Form S-1, supra note 186, at 86.  
260See HCM Acquisition Co., Amendment No. 2. to Registration Statement (Form-S-1/A), 
at II-2 (Nov. 21, 2007).  
261See HCM Acquisition Co., Amendment No. 5 to Registration Statement (Form-S-1/A),  
at i. (May 23, 2008).  
262See Initial Key Offerings Public Offerings Deal Data, EDGAR ONLINE, 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1414123/000095013408010199/0000950134-08-010199-
index.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2012) (showing that for 2012 "Shareholder Shares Offered," no 
dollar figure is offered).  
263See infra Table 4.  
264Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1, supra note 184, at i. 
265Id.   
266Id. at 58; Investment Banking: Raising Capital Through Innovative Solutions and Global 
Distribution Channels, MAXIM GRP. (2012), http://www.maximgrp.com/ investmentbanking/ 
("Maxim Group is recognized as a leading underwriter of Business Combination Companies 
(BCCs), commonly referred to as Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), with over $2.6 
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announced a focus on the homeland security and defense industries.267  The 
company had eighteen months to consummate an acquisition, unless it 
entered into a letter of intent in that period, in which case it would have 
another six months to complete an acquisition.268  Initially Alpha Security 
intended to be traded OTC,269 but by September 21, 2006 it switched to the 
AMEX.270  Although many of the risk factors it presented were similar to 
those of other SPAC offerings,271 its filings did identify a special set of risk 
factors pertaining to unique risks associated with the homeland security and 
defense industries.272  In other words, the registration statement was 
somewhat tailored—not wholly a cut-and-paste job.  Alpha Security agreed 
to pay ASG Management, Inc., an affiliated third party of which the CEO 
and executive vice president were principals, $7,500 per month for office 
space and administrative services.273  Later amendments changed the size of 
the offering to 6 million units at $10 per share.274  On March 6, 2007, the 
SPAC revised its conversion threshold from the original 20% (which the 
SEC in a comment letter described as the "industry standard") to 35%, thus 
making it harder for investors to veto the deal.275 
Alpha Security finally went public March 23, 2007.276  
The overallotment was not exercised, but the offering generated 
$63,200,000:  $60 million from the sale of units and $3.2 million from a 
private placement of warrants priced at $1.00 per share.277  On June 14, 
                                                                                                             
billion in issuance in 26 transactions, including acting as lead manager in 11 transactions.").  
267Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1, supra note 184, at 1.  
268Id. at 9.  
269Id. at i ("We intend to apply to have our units quoted on the OTC Bulletin Board . . . ."); 
see also About the OTC BB (Over the Counter Bulletin Board), OTC STOCK LIST, http://www.otc 
stocklist.com/about-the-otcbb/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2012) ("[T]he OTC BB typically trades 
securities that are not listed on one of the major US Exchanges (NASDAQ, New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and more . . . .").  
270See Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement (Form-S-1/A),  
at i (Sept. 21, 2006).   
271See Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1, supra note 184, at 9-20 (describing the risks 
Alpha brought to investors as a SPAC in general).  
272See id. at 20-24 (describing the risks Alpha brought to investors as a homeland 
security/defense SPAC).   
273Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1, supra note 184, at 2.  
274Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1/A, supra note 270, at i.   
275Letter from John Reynolds, Assistant Dir. of the SEC, to Steven Wasserman, CEO of 
Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., at 2 (Mar. 13, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1329361/ 
000000000007012986/filename1.pdf.  If a percentage between 20% and 35% exercise their 
redemption rights, a proportional percentage of the initial stockholders' common stock would be 
forfeit.  Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6 (Apr. 15, 2008).  
276See Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Notice of Effectiveness (Form S-1) (Mar. 23, 2007).  
277Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Apr. 3, 2007).  
882 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 37 
 
 
2007, the stock and warrants began trading separately.278  Alpha Security 
board members included the former governor of New Mexico279 and a former 
Air Force general.280  The SPAC was late in filing several 10-Qs and its first 
10-K, painting a picture of a somewhat unsophisticated company.281  On 
September 26, 2008, when the eighteen-month acquisition period was about 
to elapse, the company issued a press release stating that it had entered into a 
letter of intent and had until March 28, 2009 to complete a business 
combination.282   
On December 31, 2008, Alpha Security entered into a merger 
agreement with Soya China Pte. Ltd. ("Soya"), under which it was to transfer 
6,300,000 shares of Alpha Security common stock and an aggregate of 
$30,000,000 for the company's outstanding shares.283  Soya appears to be a 
food and beverage company;284 it is hard to characterize it as within the 
 
                                                                                                             
278Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Item 8.01 (June 12, 2007). 
279Capital Markets: Company Overview of Alpha Security Group Corp., BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId 
=24208127&privcapId=23733880&previousCapId=248869&previousTitle=ALLIANT%20TECHS
YSTEMS%20INC.  
280Ronald Fogleman, RIGHT WEB (Feb. 5, 2011), http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/Fogl 
eman_Ronald/.  
281See, e.g., Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Notification of Late Filing (Form 12b-25) (May 16, 
2008) [hereinafter Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Notification of Late Filing 10-Q] (stating Alpha's reasons 
for being late with its 10-Q); Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Notification of Late Filing (Form 12b-25) (Apr. 
1, 2008) (describing Alpha's reasons for being late with its 10-K).  The excuse on every 
Notification of Late Filing for the 10-Qs was the same: 
 The report of Alpha Security Group Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q 
could not be filed within the prescribed time period because the Company's 
financial statements could not be completed by its accountants within the 
prescribed time period without unreasonable effort or expense.  As a result, the 
Company could not solicit and obtain the necessary review of the Form 10-Q and 
signatures thereto in a timely fashion prior to the due date of the report. 
See Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Notification of Late Filing 10-Q, supra note 281.  This explanation 
seems particularly feeble given the simple nature of the financials, which basically just reported the 
interest earned on the trust account and the amounts spent on things like Delaware franchise taxes. 
See, e.g., Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., (Form 10-Q), at 2-5 (May 21, 2008) (containing Alpha's financial 
statements).  
282PR Newswire, Alpha Security Group Corporation Announces Fulfillment of Condition 
for Six Month Extension to Complete a Business Combination, SECURITY INFOWATCH (Sept. 26, 
2009), http://www.securityinfowatch.com/news/10545907/alpha-security-group-corporation-anno 
unces-fulfillment-of-condition-for-six-month-extension-to-complete-a-business-combination.  
283PR Newswire, Alpha Security Group Corporation to Acquire Soya China Pte. Ltd., 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 6, 2009) [hereinafter PR Newswire, Alpha to Acquire Soya], 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aD2RYFMWmN1o.    
284See News and Intelligence for the Soybean and Oilseed Industries, SOYATECH, 
http://www.soyatech.com/index.php (last visited Sept. 18, 2011) ("For more than 20 years, 
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homeland security or defense industries on which Alpha Security had set out 
to focus.285  Soya agreed to certain milestone payments, escrowing a number 
of Alpha Security shares that would be released only if certain income 
thresholds were met.286  The agreement also contemplated reincorporating as 
a Bermudan corporation.287   
On March 12, 2009, Alpha Security announced that it would no 
longer be pursuing the acquisition of Soya and would proceed with its 
liquidation and dissolution.288  On April 6, 2009, AMEX sent Alpha a notice 
threatening delisting for failure to file its 10-K on time.289  On May 5, the 
company sent out a proxy statement requesting a vote to amend the 
certificate of incorporation to allow for the company to continue post-
distribution—distribution would still be $10 per share.290  Alpha Security did 
not file its next 10-Q.291  On June 15, 2009, Alpha Security sent out a second 
proxy proposing dissolution, abandoning its plan of surviving after 
distribution.292  It sent out three successive proxies seeking a majority vote 
for dissolution, and was de-listed August 29, 2009.293 
A review of the beneficial ownership filings (required for holders of 
greater than 5% of the company and insiders)294 reveals investments by 
                                                                                                             
Soyatech's products and services for the global soybean and oilseed industry have fostered growth 
in food, feed and renewable energy markets."). 
285See supra note 267 and accompanying text.  
286See PR Newswire, Alpha to Acquire Soya, supra note 283.  
287See id.  
288PR Newswire, Alpha Security Group Corporation Terminates Merger Agreement With 
Soya China Pte…., Reuters (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/13/id 
US19551+13-Mar-2009+PRN20090313.  
289PR Newswire, Alpha Security Group Corporation Notified by NYSE Amex, BLOOMBERG 
(Apr. 10, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive &sid=aN6ipAVnbWl8.  
290Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 2 (May 5, 2009) [hereinafter 
Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Proxy Statement].  Some language makes it seem as if distribution is 
conditioned on approving the proposal.  See id. ("To consider and vote on a proposal to permit the 
Company to distribute the assets of the Trust Account to the holders of the IPO Shares (the 
'Distribution Proposal').  This proposal will be acted upon following, and will be conditioned upon, 
the approval of the Certificate of Incorporation Amendment Proposal."). 
291Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (June 1, 2009).  
292Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14-A), at 1 (July 29, 
2009).  
293See, e.g., Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14-A), at 1 (July 
30, 2009) ("[O]ur board of directors has determined it would be in the best interests of our 
stockholders to liquidate and dissolve and distribute now to stockholders holding shares of our 
common stock . . . in the trust account . . . ."); Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Notification of Removal From 
Listing and/or Registration Under Section 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 25) 
(Aug. 19, 2009).  
294Schedule 13D, SEC, http://sec.gov/answers/sched13.htm (last modified Apr. 4, 2012). 
For Alpha, the relevant information is found on its Schedule 13G; see Exchange Act Sections 
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individuals,295 investment funds (including entities that appear to specialize 
in SPAC investments, e.g., "Fir Tree SPAC Holdings"),296 and Harvard 
University's endowment, which made an investment when the acquisition 
was announced and sold shortly before Alpha Security was delisted.297   
Successful combinations.  Services Acquisition Corp. International 
("Services") registered its S-1 on February 14, 2005.298  It hoped to raise $40 
million by selling 5 million units at $8 per share (warrants exercisable at $6 
per share).299  Broadband Capital Management, LLC was the underwriter.300  
The prospectus announced that it would seek as a target a service business in 
the United States, although it left open the possibility of an international 
acquisition.301  The company had eighteen months to consummate an 
acquisition, unless it entered into a letter of intent in that period, in which 
case it would have a six-month extension.302  Initially Services intended to be 
traded OTC,303 but by June 28, 2005 its plans had switched to the AMEX.304  
The conversion threshold was set at 20%.305  No executives received a salary, 
but Services was to pay two entities—one a corporation owned and managed 
by the CEO, the other an "affiliate" of the Vice President and a director—a 
total of $7,500 per month for office space and administrative support.306  
Sponsors would own 20% of the company if an acquisition were to go 
through.307  In connection with the offering, the sponsors bought 1 million 
warrants at $1.20 on the open market, agreeing not to sell them until after the 
business combination.308 
                                                                                                             
13(d) and 13(g) and Regulation 13D-G Beneficial Ownership Reporting, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/ 
divisions/corpfin/guidance/reg13d-interp.htm (last modified Nov. 16, 2009) (explaining the subtle 
differences between Schedules 13D and 13G).  
295Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., (Schedule 13G) (June 5, 2009) (naming Bulldog Investors, 
Phillip Goldstein, and Andrew Dakos as investors).  
296See Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Amendment No. 3 to Schedule 13G, (SC13G/A), at 5 (Feb. 
16, 2010).  
297See Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Amendment No. 1 to Schedule 13G, (SC13G/A), at 2-5 
(Sept. 8, 2009).   
298Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Registration Statement (Form S-1), at i (Feb. 14, 2005). 
299Id. at 2.  
300Id. at 43.  
301Id. at 1.  
302Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Form S-1, supra note 298, at 4. 
303Id. at i.   
304Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Amendment No. 4 to Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), 
at i (June 28, 2005).  
305Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Form S-1, supra note 298, at 5.  
306Id. at 33. 
307Id. at 17. 
308Id. at 37. 
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Services went public on July 6, 2005.309  The underwriters exercised 
the overallotment option.310  The warrants separated from the common stock 
on July 28, 2005.311  It timely filed 10-Qs312 and its annual report.313  On 
March 10, 2006, the company announced an agreement with Jamba Juice 
Company, a maker of juices and smoothies, for $265 million.314  If the 
business combination were to go through, the warrant holders would be able 
to exercise their warrants and pay $6 for stock trading at $10.55, thus 
creating substantial dilution for Jamba Juice.315  Services also conducted a 
private placement financing on March 10 and March 15, 2006, which 
included as investors certain current Jamba Juice stockholders and board 
members.316  It appears that the private placement not only raised $231.6 
million to be used as merger consideration, but also allowed Jamba Juice 
insiders to avoid at least some dilution from the warrants.317  On November 
28, 2006, Services' shareholders approved the acquisition.318  The company 
"up-listed" to the NASDAQ319 and its common stock began trading under 
the symbol JMBA, under which it still trades today.320  
 
                                                                                                             
309Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (July 6, 2005).  
310Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Amendment No. 1 to Current Report (Form 8-K/A), at 2 
(July 7, 2005). 
311Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (July 25, 2005).  
312See generally Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at F-1 to F-4 
(Aug. 15, 2005) (containing Services' financial statements).  
313See Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 29, 2006) 
("This 10-K was prepared and relates to the Company as of December 31, 2005.").  
314Servs. Acquisition Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 99.1 (Mar. 13, 2006).  
315See Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2-3 (Mar. 16, 2006); 
Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14-A), at 34 (Mar. 29, 2006) 
("Each warrant expires on June 28, 2009, or earlier upon redemption, and entitles the holder to 
purchase one share of our common stock at an exercise price of $6.00 per share.").  
316Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Current Report (Mar. 16, 2006), supra note 315, at 4.  
317See id.; Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Schedule 14-A, supra note 316, at 34.  
Presumably, with this $231.6 million, any dilution problems could be at least partially remedied.  
See Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, Form 8-K, supra note 315, at 4; Servs. Acquisition Corp. Int'l, 
Schedule 14-A, supra note 315, at 34.     
318Services Acquisition Corp (SVI) Says Shareholders Approve Merger with Jamba Juice, 
STREETINSIDER.COM, (Nov. 28, 2006), http://www.streetinsider.com/Mergers+and+Acquisitions/ 
Services+Acquisition+Corp+(SVI)+Says+Shareholders+Approve+Merger+with+Jamba+Juice/1384
982.html (announcing the shareholder approval of the merger and stating the transaction was 
expected to close the following day on November 29, 2006).   
319Letter from Gary Sundick, Vice President of Listings/Investigations to Brian K. Johnson, 
Office of Filings Information Services, SEC (Nov. 29, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/vprr/06/9999999997-06-047263.  
320See Investor Relations, JAMBA JUICE, http://ir.jambajuice.com/phoenix.zhtml?c= 
192409&p=irol-irhome (last visited Aug. 22, 2012).   
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V.  OVERVIEW OF SPAC DATA 
Having surveyed the potential fates SPACs may experience, we turn 
to our empirical data.  Our sample of SPACs consists of 243 firms that filed 
a preliminary prospectus with the SEC as a blank check company from 2003 
to 2008.  We also include some preliminary analysis of the SPAC activity 
from 2009 to December 2011, which consists of 30 filings.321  We put 
together the main sample by using Morningstar Document Research322 to 
search all S-1 filings on EDGAR323 from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 
2008 for the term "6770," which is the Standard Industrial Classification 
("SIC") designation for blank check companies.324  We could not rely on the 
SIC category itself because the SEC may reclassify successful SPACs with 
the target's SIC code number.325  For example, a SPAC may originally file 
under the blank check 6770 category.  Upon acquiring a company that makes 
and sells cookies, it would be assigned the code 2052 (the "cookies and 
crackers" category).326  A current search of 6770 SIC codes thus would not 
reveal this SPAC.  But a word search for the term "6770" in its original S-1 
filing does. 
After deleting duplicate observations and S-1s for secondary equity 
offerings, we were left with a sample of 297 possible SPACs.  Of these 
filings, fifty-four transactions had one or more characteristics that caused us 
to eliminate them from our sample. In particular: 
• Twenty-nine potential SPACs did not have 6770 as their SIC 
code in their preliminary S-1.327 
• Nine were subject to Rule 419, and thus by definition not a 
SPAC.328 
 
                                                                                                             
321See infra Table 4.  We do not include these firms in the main analysis since their period 
to find an acquisition has not yet expired.  
322Morningstar Document Research is a database that "streamlines public company 
research"  Morningstar Document Research, MORNINGSTAR (2012), http://www.10kwizard.com/.  
323EDGAR is the SEC's online filing system.  See Filings and Forms, U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last modified Feb. 21, 2012).  
324Division of Corporation Finance: Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code List 
[hereinafter SIC Code List], U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm (last modified Oct. 26, 2011).  
325See supra note 320 and accompanying text.  
326SIC Code List, supra note 324.  
327For example, the word search for "6770" in S-1s may net a firm with the address of 
"6770 Main Street." 
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• Four were not unit offerings, which is a standard characteristic of 
SPACs.329 
• Seven firms were limited partnership commodity pools, which are 
atypical of the classic SPAC.330 
• Three firms filed under small business guidelines.331 
• One proposed offering was under $10 million and proposed to 
trade in only a few states.332  
These screens left us with a sample of 243 SPACs from 2003 to 2008 
as to which we were able to learn about the entire life of the entity.  We 
provide some analysis of thirty additional SPACs that filed an S-1 from 2009 
to December 2011.  For example, 57th Street Acquisition Corp. filed an S-1 
in 2009,333 and completed an acquisition in May of 2011.334 
We used the Securities Data Company ("SDC") M&A database,335 
EDGAR filings, and LexisNexis news announcements336 to collect the 
specific data related to the proposed IPO, the IPO, and any business 
combination.  We found that there is no standard way to collect SPAC data 
from SDC, through either its IPO database or its M&A data.  The main 
reason is that SDC does not uniformly classify SPACs by a particular 
industry or even by the SIC code listed in the S-1.  Thus, we used SDC only 
as a supplemental source of SPAC life-cycle data.  All business combination 
announcement dates were collected through LexisNexis and EDGAR filings. 
                                                                                                             
328See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.   
329See supra note 178 and accompanying text.  
330See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.  
331Firms going public as "small businesses" or, after February 4, 2008, as "smaller 
reporting companies," are subject to less stringent disclosure requirements.  See Changeover to the 
SEC’s New Smaller Reporting Company System by Small Business Issuers and Non-Accelerated 
Filer Companies: A Small Entity Compliance Guide, available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/ 
secg/smrepcosysguid.pdf.  We exclude these filers for the sake of consistency across the sample. 
332Contrast this with the amounts usually invested in a SPAC, and their hallmark of free 
tradability.  See, e.g., supra note 232 and accompanying text (describing how SPAC offerings are 
usually well over $5,000,000) and supra note 230 and accompanying text (stating that SPAC 
offerings can trade as soon as the vehicle goes public).   
33357th St. Gen. Acquisition Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Nov. 16, 2009).  
334See 57th St. Gen. Acquisition Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 6, 2011).  
335SDC Platinum – Securities Data Company, HARVARD BUS. SCH. BLOOMBERG CTR., 
http://www.library.hbs.edu/go/sdcplatinum.html.  
336Information Professional, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/other-business-
solutions/news-and-business-research.page.  
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We also conducted several interviews with SPAC participants—sponsors, 
investment bankers, and lawyers—in order to further our understanding of 
these transactions.   
In Table 1, we provide an overview of the most notable SPAC 
characteristics for the purposes of this Article: the months allowed for 
combination, the conversion threshold, and the percentage of contributed 
funds held in trust.  "Months allowed for combination" corresponds to the 
limited life of the SPAC.  The shelf life of all SPACs is much shorter than 
the 10-year standard for traditional private equity.337  As seen in Table 1 
below, the longest lived SPAC observed had thirty-six months to 
complete an acquisition, and the shortest-lived SPAC observed had a mere 
eighteen months.   
 
TABLE 1.   STATISTICS FOR 243 SPACS THAT FILED            
AN  S-1 FROM 2003 TO 2008 
      Mean   Median  Maximum  Minimum 
Months allowed for combination 25.5 24.0   36.0 18.0 
Conversion threshold 27.2% 30.0% 40.0% 20.0% 
% held in trust 96.3% 98.0% 110.1% 82.8% 
 
The "conversion threshold" in Table 1 is a measure of the power of 
SPAC investors to veto a specific combination proposed by managers.338  If 
more than the given threshold votes to reject the deal and receive their share 
of the trust account back, then the acquisition will not occur.339  The 
conversion threshold thus functions as a supermajority approval requirement, 
and is a key investor protection present in SPACs and absent in traditional 
private equity.340  Table 1 demonstrates that for this sample, which ends in 
2008, the minimum conversion threshold is 20% and the maximum is 40%.  
 
                                                                                                             
337Compare Riemer, supra note 45, at 946 n.98 ("While a two-year limit was (and remains) 
typical, because SPACs are not bound by a statutory time limit, management may institute a longer 
or shorter limit at its discretion.  Second-generation SPACs generally require that a letter of intent to 
conduct a business combination be filed within eighteen months of the IPO and that the 
combination be completed within twenty-four months."), with supra notes 101, 134 and 
accompanying text (explaining the average ten-year lifespan of a private equity investment).  
338See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.   
339See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.   
340Compare supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (explaining a SPAC's "conversion 
threshold"), with supra notes 88, 137 and accompanying text (explaining the limited voice investors 
have in traditional private equity investments).  
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As Part VII of this Article will detail, we have preliminary data on more 
recent, so-called "Third Generation" SPACs, which employ a much higher 
conversion threshold, effectively eliminating investor voice.   
Finally, the "% held in trust" in Table 1 refers to the amount of the 
IPO proceeds that are held in an escrowed trust account, and may not be 
released until the conclusion of the acquisition.  It is the placement of funds 
in trust that provides investors with the assurance that they can receive most 
of their money back if the SPAC sponsors fail to find or complete a deal, or 
if the investor wishes to opt out of it.341  Table 1 shows that the range of the 
amount held in trust is 82.8% to 110%.342  
Figure 2 below shows the outcomes of SPACs over time.  As seen by 
the thick dark line, the two largest peaks in SPAC S-1 filings occurred in 
2005 and in the latter half of 2007 and the first half of 2008.  Notably, the 
success rate of the SPAC formed in these two different periods is highly 
dissimilar.  As seen in Figure 2, at the 2005 peak SPACs that completed 
both an IPO and an acquisition comprised the highest number of 
transactions, followed second by transactions that completed an IPO but not 
an acquisition, and trailed by transactions that did not complete an IPO.  In 
contrast, in the 2007/2008 peak the greatest number of transactions, by far, 
involved SPACs with withdrawn S-1s.  As demonstrated in Figure 2, some 
SPACs successfully acquired targets in 2007, but starting at the beginning of 
2008, every proposed SPAC IPO was withdrawn.  However, the graph does 
reveal the more recent resurgence in SPAC activity to levels similar to late 
2003 and 2004. 
 
                                                                                                             
341See, e.g., supra notes 174, 177, 180-82 and accompanying text (explaining the classic 
protection features of a SPAC).  
342"% held in trust" is the amount actually held in the trust account divided by the total 
amount raised in the IPO.  So if the amount paid by the sponsors for private placement shares or 
warrants exceeds the amount spent on offering costs and other miscellany, the number can exceed 
100%.   
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Figure 2. SPAC Experience by Quarter 
 
VI.  SHARED CONTRACTUAL STRATEGIES 
This Part focuses on the investor protection strategies that SPACs 
borrow from traditional private equity.  These strategies highlight the basic 
structural similarities between SPACs and their private equity cousins, and 
will ultimately allow us to appreciate the magnitude of SPACs' departures 
from the traditional private equity template in the areas of voice and exit. 
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A.  Managerial Compensation:  A Story of Convergence 
1.  The Magic 20 
Venture capital managers receive 20% of any realized gains from the 
sale or IPO of portfolio companies, known as carried interest.343  More than 
50% of venture capital firms also charge an annual 2.5% management fee.344 
Although venture capital fund managers make a modest salary and bonus, 
the carried interest makes up the lion's share of their compensation.345  
Buyout fund managers follow a similar pattern, with managers receiving 
20% of the profit.346  They also charge investors a management fee of around 
2%.347  In addition, buyout funds also charge their portfolio companies 
management fees.348    
The literature emphasizes the important role this compensation 
structure plays in constraining agency costs.349  In the venture capital context, 
Professor Ron J. Gilson calls it "the front line response to the potential for 
agency costs resulting from allocating to the GP the control necessary to 
apply its skill and expertise on behalf of the investors."350  In buyout funds, 
Professor Victor Fleischer observes:  
The carried interest thus provides the most powerful incentive 
to work hard.  A large carry is one of the hallmarks of a private 
equity fund, and is considered essential to attracting talented 
managers.  While private equity managers could live well on 
their base salaries alone, they would not be truly rich.  Only the 
compensation of the carried interest of a successful fund can do 
 
                                                                                                             
343See Fleischer, supra note 38, at 8.  
344See supra note 107 and accompanying text.  
345See Sahlman, supra note 9, at 495 ("[T]he carried interest component of compensation 
is large in relation to other components."); see also Gompers & Lerner, Analysis of Compensation, 
supra note 9, at 6 (conducting an empirical study that found management fees of 1.5% to 3% and a 
large concentration of carry at 20%). 
346See supra note 142 and accompanying text.  
347See supra note 141 and accompanying text.  
348See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 124.  
349See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 88, at 1089 (stating that venture fund compensation is the 
way for investors to keep management in line); Fleischer, supra note 100, at 97 (explaining that 
private equity managers can earn a salary anywhere, and that the funds' potential profits are what 
keep them committed).   
350Gilson, supra note 88, at 1089.   
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that, and it is the prodigious carry of successful private equity 
funds that lures professionals away from investment banks, 
commercial banks, and other investment management 
companies.351 
As originally conceived, SPAC sponsors, like traditional private 
equity managers, received around 20% of the venture's profits.352  This 
result was achieved by permitting those sponsors to buy a significant 
percentage of the SPAC shares, almost uniformly 20%, at a nominal 
amount.353  In 211 of the 260 companies observed in Figure 3 below, 
sponsors received exactly 20% of the company in the form of pre-IPO share 
sales.  As can be seen in the chart, 224 firms' sponsors received between 
20.0% and 20.9%.  Eleven firms received 16-19.9%, and another 8 firms 
received 21%-24.9%.  These sponsor shares were placed in escrow, and 
released only upon the completion of the acquisition.354  Thus, if the SPAC 
failed to find a suitable target or to gain approval of a proposed acquisition, 
sponsors did not receive a share of the trust account upon liquidation.355  In 
addition, these shares had generally to be voted with the majority of shares 
held by public shareholders—in other words, the SPAC sponsors had to vote 
their stock in accordance with the public shareholders' wishes.356  While it is 
hard to see how SPACs could be structured without this sponsor share 
escrow (because without the escrow the sponsors would immediately claim a 
sizeable share of the funds raised in the initial public offering), the 
escrowing of sponsor shares strongly motivates the sponsors to pursue a 
business combination at all costs.357  Liquidation means that the sponsors 
 
                                                                                                             
351Fleischer, supra note 100, at 97.  
352See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.  
353See, e.g., supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (explaining how the system of 
SPAC sponsors buying shares in themselves works); see also Bank St. Telecom Funding Corp., 
Form S-1, supra note 185, at 16 (stating that post-acquisition, the sponsors will "collectively own 
approximately 20% of [the] issued and outstanding shares of common stock . . . .").  
354See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.  
355See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.  
356See, e.g. Michael A. Pittinger & Cara M. Grisin, When SPACs Attack: The Role of 
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies in the M&A Market, 12 DEAL POINTS: THE NEWSLETTER 
OF THE COMM. ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, Fall 2007, at 4 n. 14 available at 
http://potteranderson.com/uploads/90/doc/Deal%20Points%20-%20Fall%202007%20issue%20SPA 
C%20article.pdf ("To ensure that any applicable stockholder vote requirements of the jurisdiction of 
organization are also satisfied, the founders typically agree to vote in favor of the proposed business 
combination or to vote their shares in accordance with the vote of the IPO shares.").  
357See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text; see also Roger Ehrenberg, Does SPAC 
Spell Scam?, SEEKING ALPHA (May 18, 2008), http://seekingalpha.com/article/77687-does-spac-
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receive nothing; indeed, if a private placement occurred, the sponsors would 
be out of pocket for the SPAC expenses.358   
 
Figure 3.  
 
 
Strikingly, the managers of each type of fund expect to make the bulk 
of their money from their claim to 20% of the profits of the venture.359  
Below the surface, however, venture and private equity funds' managerial 
compensation have much more in common with each other than with 
SPACs.  While they expect to reap most profits from carried interest (which, 
controversially, is taxed at the preferential capital gains rate),360 they also 
claim salaries and management fees.361  SPAC managers, in contrast, receive 
nothing unless and until a deal is consummated.362   
However, SPAC sponsors receive their 20%—or at least, their shares 
are released from escrow and are thus liquid—upon acquisition.363  In 
                                                                                                             
spell-scam ("SPAC sponsors . . . are all about getting the deal done, since the clock is always ticking 
on deploying their funds before they have to be returned to investors.").  
358See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text; see also Bonenfant, supra note 194 
("[F]ounders contribute nominal capital for 100% of the SPAC capital stock.  After the initial 
capitalization, the founders and other sophisticated investors participate in a private placement to 
purchase SPAC securities.  The proceeds of the private placement provide working capital to carry 
the SPAC through its IPO, and fund operating expenses until an acquisition is consummated.").   
359See supra notes 108, 142, 179-86 and accompanying text.  
360See supra note 109 and accompanying text.  
361See supra notes 108, 142 and accompanying text.  
362See supra note 182 and accompanying text.  
363See supra notes 179-82.  However, the sponsors' shares are subject to lock-ups.  See 
supra note 196 and accompanying text.   
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contrast, VC and private equity managers receive money, not upon 
investment of the fund's assets in the portfolio company, but rather upon 
realization of profit (i.e. upon sale or IPO of that company).364  So while of 
course managers of all three entities are motivated to pursue acquisitions, 
only SPAC sponsors are rewarded for the mere fact of acquisition.365  Indeed, 
a common risk factor in SPAC prospectuses warns investors:  
[T]he [officers' and directors'] shares acquired prior to this 
offering, as well as the sponsors' warrants and any warrants 
purchased by our officers or directors in the aftermarket, will 
be worthless if we do not consummate our initial business 
combination.  The personal and financial interests of our 
directors and officers may influence their motivation in timely 
identifying and selecting a target business and completing a 
business combination.  Consequently, our directors' and 
officers' discretion in identifying and selecting a suitable target 
business may result in a conflict of interest when determining 
whether the terms, conditions and timing of a particular 
business combination are appropriate and in our stockholders' 
best interest.366 
Interestingly, modern SPACs have reduced or delayed the sponsor's 
ability to realize all of the "Magic 20" upon acquisition.367  For example, a 
recent SPAC provided that transfer restrictions limiting the ability of the 
sponsors to sell shares would lapse as certain milestones were reached: 20% 
upon acquisition, 20% after the closing price of the stock was over $12.00, 
and additional 20% increments when it reached $13.50, $15.00, and 
$17.00.368  This conditioning of compensation on profit, rather than on 
 
                                                                                                             
364See Gilson, supra note 88, at 1089.  Clawbacks delay the GP's payout, or hold it back, 
until total performance is known.  Id.  
365See Ehrenberg, supra note 357.  
366Hyde Park Acquisition Corp. II, Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S-
1/A), at 31 (June 10, 2011). 
367Stuart Neuhauser, Assessing the Resurgence of SPACs in the 2011 IPO Market,  IPO 
VITAL SIGNS (June 17, 2011), http://www.ipovitalsigns.com/PressReleases/6_20_11_Article.htm 
("In addition, Generation III SPACs have either reduced the sponsor's ownership in the vehicle or 
provided for tranching/forfeiture of such interests based upon stock appreciation of the SPAC post 
business combination.").   
368Empeiria Acquisition Corp., Amendment No. 4 to Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), 
at 6 (May 24, 2011). 
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investment, makes recent SPACs look even more like their private equity 
cousins.  
2.  "Skin in the Game"  
The incentives of the SPAC sponsor are of critical importance.  
Initially sponsors put up little of their own money, but now they often 
purchase additional shares or warrants through a private placement369 around 
the time of the offering, in the offering itself, or in the secondary market.370  
These purchases supplement the amount the sponsors have put at risk in the 
SPAC and increase their "skin in the game."371   
Private placements also allow the SPAC to promise investors that 
close to 100% of the proceeds will remain in trust, as the private placement 
funds, rather than the offering proceeds, are used to pay the SPAC's 
operating expenses.372  Sometimes these later-acquired sponsor shares carry 
with them no voting restrictions and allow for participation without 
restriction in any liquidation event.373  In other cases, private placements are 
subject to escrow and other restrictions.374  As seen in Table 2 below, the 
average (median) amount invested by the managers of the firms observed in 
a private placement was $3.3 ($2.5) million.  This amount represents about 
2.5% of the total amount of proposed proceeds.  In addition, there were fifty-
five SPACs, most of which were formed before 2006, for which there was 
no private placement at all.   
 
                                                                                                             
369In a private placement, securities are sold to a small number of investors to raise capital 
without a public offering.  Private Placement, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/ 
glossary/p/private-placement.  
370See Ellenoff Grossman & Schole LLP, "SPAC" Special Purpose 
Acquisition Corporation, www.egsllp.com/SPACPPP.ppt (characterizing "[c]oncurrent [p]rivate 
[p]lacement/[s]ponsor [l]oans" as a "historical trend").  
371See id.; Telephone Interview with Doug Ellenoff, Member of Ellenoff Grossman & 
Schole LLP (Mar. 4, 2011); see also Riemer, supra note 45, at 959 (describing how traditional 
money invested by SPAC sponsors constitutes "skin in the game").  
372See Bonenfant, supra note 194.  
373See Neuhauser, supra note 367 (stating that one of the objectives of newly developed 
SPACs is to "align[] the equity interests of the sponsor with investors and target businesses").  
374See, e.g., Catalytic Capital Inv. Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 2 (Mar. 24, 
2006).  
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TABLE 2.   STATISTICS FOR 270 PROPOSED SPACS THAT 
FILED AN S-1 FROM 2003 TO 2011 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum 
Proposed IPO Proceeds ($mil) $141.1 $100.0 $900.0 $12.5 
Private Placement ($mil) $3.3 $2.5 $35.0 $0.0 
      -2003 to 2005 (83 observations) $0.8 $0.0 $11.3 $0.0 
      -2006 to 2011 (177 observations) $4.6 $3.8 $35.0 $0.0 
Private Placement / Prop. IPO 
Proceeds 2.5% 2.5%     9.7%        0.0% 
     -2003 to 2005 (83 observations) 1.2% 0.0%     9.1%      0.0% 
     -2006 to 2011 (177 observations) 3.1% 2.9%     9.7%      0.0% 
 
Indeed, as the SPAC form evolved, sponsors were expected to put 
more and more of their own money at risk (in the form of private 
placements), setting themselves up for substantial losses if no acquisition 
occurred.375  In the interviews we conducted, we heard two explanations for 
the marked increase in private placements.  The first is the "skin in the 
game" explanation: in the early years, successful SPAC sponsors received 
20% of companies without risking much, and the consensus was that the 
market demanded more of a show of commitment from the managers.376  The 
second explanation discounted the "skin in the game" theory, suggesting 
instead that the market's true concern was with pursuing shareholder 
protection through ever-larger escrow accounts.377  The SPAC model is easily 
 
                                                                                                             
375See Barker & Hedin, supra note 43, at 38 ("More recent deals are placing between 95-
100% in trust (net of underwriters' compensation and expenses but not of other offering expenses).  
SPACs that place 100% into the trust account raise the necessary funds for their offering expenses 
and other expenses incurred in connection with identifying and evaluating a target business 
through private placements to, and borrowings from, the founding stockholders or sponsors.") 
(footnote omitted).    
376See Telephone Interview with Doug Ellenoff, supra note 371.  
377See id.  
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mimicked; the largely generic filings are publicly available,378 and the 
company itself is merely an empty shell.379  The primary way for a SPAC to 
distinguish itself from the rapidly multiplying number of competitors was to 
offer investors more of their money back if no acquisition occurred or if they 
exercised their opt-out rights.380  This explanation correlates with the trend 
we discuss in Part VII, pursuant to which the SPAC trusts retained ever-
higher percentages of the public offering proceeds.381  Increasing amounts 
held in trust decreased the amount of offering proceeds available to run the 
SPAC.382  Operating money had to come from somewhere else, and the 
SPACs' sponsors were the obvious choice.383 
Whatever the reason, SPAC sponsors now commit their own money to 
the fund, an average of 2.5% of the IPO proceeds.384  While a comparison to 
traditional private equity would be revealing, we have found little hard data 
on the amount that buyout and venture GPs invest in their own funds.  
Estimates range from 1%-5% of the capital of the fund.385  The authors of 
one treatise recommend, as a minimum general partner investment, the lesser 
of 0.2% of total capital commitments and $500,000.386  This may, however, 
be only a minimum.387  For "marketing purposes"—to ensure an alignment of 
interests with investors—managers may be expected to contribute more 
capital to the fund.388  One source reports that the mean contribution by 
 
                                                                                                             
378See supra note 323 for an explanation of EDGAR, the SEC's electronic filing system.  
379See supra notes 172, 175-76 and accompanying text.  
380See Wittlin & Ferris, supra note 241, at 2 (explaining the traditional SPAC structure).  
381See M. Ridgway Barker & Michael L. Pflaum, Exchanges for Listing SPACs – A Shifting 
Landscape, THE METRO. CORP. COUNSEL 5, 5 (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.metrocorpco 
unsel.com/pdf/2009/January/05.pdf (stating that pursuant to new NYSE and NASDAQ rules, at 
least 90% of what is earned in the IPO must go into the trust account).  
382See Barker & Hedin, supra note 43, at 38.  
383See id.   
384See supra Table 2.  
385Fleischer, supra note 38, at 8; see also Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating 
Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 183, 229 (2009) ("[I]t is common for investors in 
hedge funds or private equity partnerships to insist that the managers themselves place a 
meaningful percentage of their own net worth at risk alongside the investors' money."). 
386STEPHANIE BRESLOW & PHYLLIS SCHWARTZ, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: FORMATION 
AND OPERATION § 2:5.3, at 2-28 (Practicing Law Inst., 1st ed. 2009).  Tax reasons partly explain 
the requirement of GP investment.  Id.; see also Fleischer, supra note 100, at 82 ("The GP also 
contributes about 1% of the capital to the fund.  This amount, which is largely an artifact of tax 
history, is small in comparison to the carry and generally has a negligible effect on incentives.") 
(footnote omitted). 
387BRESLOW, supra note 386, § 2:5.3[B], at 2-29.  
388Id.   
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general partners was 3.25% for buyout funds and 2.1% for venture capital 
funds.389     
Much remains unclear about the extent and reasons for managers' 
investment in the funds they oversee.  What is clear is that the norm in 
traditional private equity is for managers to have some stake in the firm.390  
SPACs initially deviated from this pattern, but quickly conformed to it.391  
As Part VIII of this Article discusses, some commentators view managerial 
investment in traditional private equity as a mere "artifact of tax history."392  
But evidence that SPAC founders experienced evolutionary pressure to put 
up their own money, coupled with the move to condition the distribution of 
escrowed shares to the founders on performance goals, suggests that "skin in 
the game" might actually be significant in traditional private equity as well.393 
    
B.  Time Limit 
SPACs share with venture capital and private-equity firms the 
characteristic of a built-in fund life.394  Venture funds are usually ten years in 
length, although they can be extended for up to three years, usually in one-
year increments.395  Private equity funds follow this pattern.396  "[P]artners are 
automatically cashed out of the fund on expiration of the fund's limited 
term . . . ."397  Sahlman calls the limited life of a VC fund "the ultimate tool 
for aligning the interests of the agent and principal . . . ."398  "[T]he venture 
capitalist cannot keep the money forever," and knows he will be called to 
account at a certain date.399   
 
                                                                                                             
389Robert C. Illig, Hedge Funds: The Missing Link in Executive Pay Reform, 28 BANKING 
& FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP. 10, 11 n.7 (2009) (citations omitted).  
390See supra notes 385-89 and accompanying text.  
391See supra note 370 and accompanying text.  
392See Fleischer, supra note 100, at 82.  
393See supra BRESLOW, supra note 386, § 2:5.3[B] ("[I]t is typically viewed as 
acceptable and even as desirable that a portion of the sponsor commitments come from other 
employees who will be actively involved in managing the funds.") (emphasis added).    
394See supra note 337 and accompanying text.  
395Sahlman, supra note 9, at 490. 
396See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 123. 
397Ribstein, supra note 150, at 299. 
398Sahlman, supra note 9, at 501.   
399See id. at 494, 501 ("The possibility that the interests of general and limited partners will 
diverge over time is addressed directly by limiting the lifespan on the venture-capital partnership.  
The ability to withdraw funding support is the ultimate tool for aligning the interests of the agent 
and principal in this organizational form, and is reinforced by the existence of the scale or scope 
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While SPACs also employ a fixed life, their life span is much shorter 
than that of the ten-year private equity fund.400  Typically SPACs have an 
initial time limit, originally eighteen months—exactly paralleling the 
requirements of Rule 419.401  As with venture capital and private equity 
funds, SPAC structures sometimes allow for an extension of the original 
time period (usually by six months) if a letter of intent with a target company 
is signed.402  Counting the extension period, most SPACs impose a limit of 
two years on completing an acquisition.403   
The variation in SPAC shelf life, as seen in Table 3 below, is striking. 
When the NYSE and NASDAQ began listing SPACs in 2008, they 
permitted a maximum of thirty-six months for a combination, which is the 
maximum we observed in our sample.404  The minimum time permitted we 
observed is eighteen months, and the average allowed for a preliminary 
acquisition agreement to be reached was twenty-five months.405  For our 
sample's thirty Third Generation SPACs (those SPACs with an initial S-1 
filed from 2009-2011) the range is from fifteen to twenty-three months to 
complete an acquisition.406  It thus appears that, unlike in the venture capital 
and private-equity context, no industry norm has emerged for SPAC 
duration.407 
We posit that this lack of uniformity may be because the time limit 
constraint necessarily functions differently in the SPAC, where ownership is 
liquid, than in the private venture or buyout fund.  For traditional investment 
funds, a fund's expiration date functions both to discipline managers and to 
provide liquidity to investors.408  SPACs separate these functions.  Public 
trading of SPAC shares guarantees a measure of liquidity.409  SPACs 
                                                                                                             
economies and learning-curve effects."). 
400 See supra note 337 and accompanying text.  
401See Derek K. Heyman, From Blank Check to SPAC: The Regulator's Response to the 
Market, and the Market's Response to the Regulation, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 531, 542 
(2007) (explaining the timing similarities between Rule 419 and a typical SPAC).  
402See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 45, at 946 n.98 (explaining the normal time constraints on 
a SPAC).  
403See, e.g., id.   
404Client Alert: Nasdaq Joins NYSE and AMEX in Allowing Listing of Special Purpose 
Acquisition Companies (SPACs), Chadbourne & Parke LLP, (Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.chadbo 
urne.com/clientalerts/2008/specialacquisition/.   
405See infra Table 4.  
406See infra Table 4.  
407See supra notes 101, 134 and accompanying text.  
408See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 73, at 123 (explaining how and why management 
divides up the ten year period in LBOs).  
409See Heyman, supra note 401, at 543 (stating that SPACs now being listed on exchanges 
"increases their liquidity and access to capital . . . .").  
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generally trade at a slight premium to their share of the trust account, 
reflecting the option value that SPACs provide regarding future 
acquisitions.410  
However, the SPAC model does require some kind of expiration 
date.411  The time constraints associated with SPACs limit the amount of time 
managers have the trust account at their disposal.412  Without them, investors 
might worry that managers will simply sit on the money indefinitely; a 
limited lifespan thus increases the value of the trust fund to investors.413   
C.  Concentration Limits 
Traditional private equity funds place limits on the amount that may 
be committed to any one acquisition, i.e., on the amount that can be invested 
in a single company.414  This contractual constraint prevents a fund from 
being overexposed to any one company.415  What investors look for from 
these funds is a portfolio—a bench or lineup of companies.416  It is 
understood that some companies will underperform, but ideally there will be 
one or two "home runs" that generate outsized returns that help produce the 
overall 20%-30%417 return for which managers of these entities aim.  Some 
may even specify certain percentages of asset classes the fund must hold.418   
 
                                                                                                             
410See Barker & Hedin, supra note 41, at 6 (stating that "the SPAC's common stock 
trades at a substantial premium . . . .").  
411See supra note 404 and accompanying text.  
412See Riemer, supra note 45, at 946 n.98 (citations omitted).  
413See id. (describing the timeline of SPACs). 
414Sahlman, supra note 9, at 496-99; Gompers & Lerner, The Use of Covenants, supra note 
160, at 480.  
415See Gompers & Lerner, The Use of Covenants, supra note 160, at 480 ("These 
provisions are intended to ensure that the general partners do not attempt to salvage an investment 
in a poorly performing firm by investing significant resources in follow-on funding.").  
416See supra notes 102-03 (explaining "portfolio companies").  
417See Edward Wolkowitz et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing in Mega-Cases: 
Transcript of Proceedings, 39 SW. U. L. REV. 643, 669 (2010); see also Sandra Bosela, Valuation – 
Spreadsheet or Napkin?, 2005 J. BUS. VALUATION 229, 232 (2005) ("Historically, 25 to 30 percent 
was a common hurdle or target IRR for private equity investors.").   
418Gompers & Lerner, The Use of Covenants, supra note 160, at 483. 
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TABLE 3.   STATISTICS FOR 86 SPACS THAT COMPLETED 
AN ACQUISITION 
   Mean  Median   Max.   Min. 
IPO proceeds ($mil) $124.0 $60.0 $900.0 $15.8 
Value of combination ($mil) $254.0 $128.4 $3,403.4 $13.0 
Value of comb. / IPO proceeds 252.4% 181.1% 1,3507.7% 13.0% 
 
SPACs, in contrast, are one-shot deals.  In a traditional SPAC, any 
business combination must have a fair market value of at least 80% of the 
trust value.419  This provision restricts the sponsors from being able to access 
the trust account for anything less than a substantial business combination 
(and also mirrors a Rule 419 requirement).420  In Table 3 above, we show 
statistics on eighty-six of the eighty-seven transactions observed in which the 
SPAC was able to successfully acquire a target.  As can be seen, the average 
amount paid for the acquisition is $254 million and the range of acquisition 
size is vast, especially in comparison to the range of IPO proceeds, from a 
minimum of $13.0 million to a maximum of $3.4 billion.  Furthermore, the 
average value of the acquisition, scaled by the value of the IPO proceeds of 
252%, exceeds the bar of 80% significantly.421 However, Table 3 does show 
that about 10% of the acquisitions do not exceed the 80% hurdle.  This is 
primarily for two reasons.  First, we measured only the initial acquisition 
made.  Second, our sample contained instances of SPACs renegotiating the 
SPAC's terms with shareholders, which we found lead to a partial 
liquidation of funds and thus a lower proceeds amount. 
Although restrictions on the amount that may be committed in SPACs 
are the polar opposite to those in traditional private equity (i.e., SPACs 
require commitment to one transaction, whereas venture and buyout funds 
require multiple investments), the restrictions are cut from the same cloth.422  
 
                                                                                                             
419See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 4, at 225. 
420See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 45, at 942 (stating that Rule 419 maintained an 80% rule 
as well).   
421See supra note 420 and accompanying text.   
422Davidoff, supra note 4, at 238 ("A SPAC has similar suboptimal risk-bearing 
characteristics vis-à-vis the private equity fund investment for which it ostensibly substitutes.  A 
purchase of SPAC securities is typically an investment in a single, to-be-determined acquisition.") 
(footnote omitted).   
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In each case, the contractual limitation helps ensure that the managers honor 
the governing principle of the investment.423  In the case of traditional private 
equity, the goal is investment in multiple private companies.424  In the case of 
SPACs, it is investment in a single company.425  Each form places 
contractual limits on investment amounts in order to achieve its specified 
end.426 
D.  Reporting of Information 
As private firms offering only to accredited investors, venture and 
private equity funds are exempt from the mandatory disclosure 
requirements of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.427  Buyout and VC 
investors nonetheless usually have contractual rights to receive periodic 
reports from their managers, in the form of fund-level financial 
statements.428  Venture investors have annual meetings with the GPs and 
sometimes with the management of key portfolio companies.429  They may 
receive written information on portfolio companies as well, at the discretion 
of the GP.430 
As holders of publicly traded securities, SPAC investors receive 
the periodic reports required by the 1934 Act: annual reports, quarterly 
reports, proxy statements, and 8-Ks whenever material changes in the 
company occur.431  However, this level of transparency is not as great as first 
impressions may suggest.  SPACs' public filings are generally boilerplate; 
indeed, a main attraction of the form is that, because the company is a 
"shell," there is little of substance to disclose in the initial prospectus.432  
Once a firm is public, its quarterly and annual reports do little more than 
 
                                                                                                             
423See id. at 225.  
424Id. at 189.  
425Id. at 225.  
426See Davidoff, supra note 4, at 225.  
427Spindler, supra note 133, at 311.  
428See id. at 327-28 (explaining the usual types of information private investors receive). 
429Sahlman, supra note 9, at 492. 
430See Spindler, supra note 133, at 327. 
431See Riemer, supra note 45, at 963 ("SPACs must issue all reports and disclosures 
required of public companies, and they must also comply with the disclosure requirements of the 
exchanges on which they trade."); see also Bonenfant, supra note 194 (listing the SEC rules that 
SPACs must follow).   
432See SEC Restricts SPAC Managers' Warrant Purchases, THE REVERSE MERGER 
REPORT, 14-15 (2005), http://www.littmankrooks.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/SEC-Restricts-
SPAC-Managers-Warrant-Purchases.pdf.  
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disclose the interest earned by the trust account.433  The SPAC files an 8-K  
to announce an acquisition target,434 but until that announcement the SPAC 
investor is generally about as informed as her counterpart in a venture or 
buyout fund.435 
E.  Reputation and Serial Funds 
While the shelf life of an individual fund or SPAC is limited, 
successful managers in all three forms often create multiple funds within a 
family to leverage past successes and reap the benefits that accrue to repeat 
players.436   
In their brief history, SPACs have been organized so close on each 
others' heels that the reputational value seems limited.437  But we do see serial 
SPAC sponsors who tout their past successes.438  For example, after Aldabra 
Acquisition Corporation successfully acquired the Great Lakes Dredge & 
Dock Corp., the same sponsors organized Aldabra 2 Acquisition Corp., 
Aldabra 3 Acquisition Corp., and Aldabra 4 Acquisition Corp.439  It remains 
to be seen whether repeat SPAC sponsors will develop the reputational 
capital we posit is so crucial in traditional private equity.440 
 
                                                                                                             
433See, e.g., Hicks Acquisition Co. II, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 7 (May 7, 
2012) ("The Company has not generated any revenues, other than interest income earned on the 
proceeds held in the trust account established in connection with the Offering.").   
434See Bonenfant, supra note 194.  
435See SEC Restricts SPAC Managers' Warrant Purchases, supra note 432, at 15 ("SPACs 
regularly say in SEC filings before their public offerings that they have yet to find a company that 
they would like to acquire.  That's because it would be more difficult for a SPAC to go public if it 
found an acquisition target first.  The SPACs' filings with the SEC would then have to include 
detailed disclosures about the target company's business and finances.").  
436See Riemer, supra note 45, at 958 n.182 (citation omitted) (quoting one equity manager 
as stating that "when a bank is evaluating a SPAC, 'management is almost as important as the type 
of structure used'").  
437See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.  
438See Riemer, supra note 45, at 958 n.182.  
439See Aldabra 4 Acquisition Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Dec. 31, 2007); 
Aldabra Acquisition Corp., Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement (Form S-4) (Nov. 8, 2006) 
(offering the merger of Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Holdings Corp.).  
440See supra notes 18, 22-25 (explaining the importance of reputation in traditional private 
equity).  
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F.  Conflicts of Interest 
One final difference between SPACs and traditional private equity 
merits attention before we move to the larger questions of voice and exit.  
Venture and buyout fund investors commonly use contractual constraints to 
mitigate managers' conflicts of interest.441  In particular, venture funds place 
limitations on GPs' abilities to invest their own money in portfolio 
companies.442  This limitation makes sense because "[i]f general partners 
invest in selected firms, they may devote excessive time to these firms and 
may not terminate funding if the firms encounter difficulties."443  Other 
contractual provisions, such as restrictions on outside activities and 
requirements that GPs spend substantially all of their time managing the 
fund, ensure that managers do not shirk their responsibilities.444  VCs also 
limit co-investments with earlier funds of the same family to ensure that a 
later fund is not propping up the poor choices of an earlier fund.445     
In contrast, the original SPAC template specifies that management 
will not devote much time to running the SPAC.446  SPACs disclose upfront 
to investors that conflicts are possible, and even likely, in light of these 
arrangements.447  Consider, for example, the following language appearing in 
Bank St. Telecom Funding Corp.'s S-1:  
Our officers and directors are currently and may in the future 
become affiliated with entities, including other "blank check" 
companies, engaged in business activities similar to those 
intended to be conducted by us. . . .  Our officers and directors 
may become aware of business opportunities that may be 
appropriate for presentation to us as well as the other entities 
with which they are or may be affiliated. . . .  Accordingly, they 
 
                                                                                                             
441See Gompers & Lerner, The Use of Covenants, supra note 160, at 481-84 (describing 
the clashes that can exist between general partners and limited partners).  
442See id. at 481.    
443Id.   
444See, e.g., id. at 482 (explaining how investors may take care of conflicted management 
problems); see also Sahlman, supra note 9, at 492-93 (listing some common restrictions in 
management contracts).   Such restrictions often apply for the first few years of the fund or until a 
set percentage of the funds has been invested.  Gompers & Lerner, The Use of Covenants, supra 
note 160, at 482.   
445Gompers & Lerner, The Use of Covenants, supra note 160, at 480-81.  
446See supra note 184 and accompanying text.  
447See, e.g., Bank St. Telecom Funding Corp., Form S-1, supra note 185, at 12 (stating 
outright that conflicts are possible).  
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may have conflicts of interests in determining to which entity a 
particular business opportunity may be presented.  We cannot 
assure you that these conflicts will be resolved in our favor.448 
HCM's S-1 states that "[o]ur officers and directors may tend to favor 
potential initial business combinations with target businesses that offer to 
reimburse any expenses that we did not have the funds to reimburse 
ourselves."449  Consider also the following language appearing on Alpha 
Security Group's S-1: 
Since our directors own shares of our common stock which will 
be released from escrow only in certain limited situations, our 
board may have a conflict of interest in determining whether a 
particular target business is appropriate to effect a business 
combination. The personal and financial interests of our 
directors and officers may influence their motivation in 
identifying and selecting a target business and completing a 
business combination timely.450 
 The difference in strategy is striking.  In traditional private equity 
firms, conflicts are painstakingly circumscribed.  In the SPAC context, 
conflicts are cheerfully acknowledged.  The investor is informed of their 
existence and warned to proceed at her own risk.451  The manager may slack 
off or make decisions for his personal interest.452   
To the extent the SPAC model works, it must be because other 
investor protections—the trust account, the liquidity provided by the public 
market, SEC regulation, etc.—counteract the contractual freedom of 
 
                                                                                                             
448Id.; see also Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1, supra note 184, at 13-14 (stating similar 
language). 
449HCM Acquisition Co., Form S-1, supra note 186, at 86. 
450Alpha Sec. Grp. Corp., Form S-1, supra note 184, at 48. 
451See supra notes 446-50 and accompanying text.  
452See supra notes 446-50 and accompanying text.  There are hints, in the last quarter of 
2011, that this tolerance of conflicts of interest might be changing.  See, e.g., Chart Acquisition 
Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 4 (Oct. 13, 2011) ("[O]ur officers and directors have 
agreed not to participate in the formation of, or become an officer or director of, any blank check 
company until we have entered into a definitive agreement regarding our initial business 
combination or we have failed to complete our initial business combination within 21 months from 
the date of this prospectus."); HBC Acquisition Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 5 
(Sept. 6, 2011) (stating similar language); ROI Acquisition Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-
1), at 7 (Oct. 14, 2011) (stating similar language). 
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managers to act in their own interest.  We now turn to the two chief 
protections for SPAC investors: voice and exit. 
VII.  EVOLUTION IN INNOVATION: VOICE AND EXIT IN SPACS 
Beyond the investor protections detailed in Part VI of this Article, 
there are two obvious mechanisms for disciplining managers: (1) giving 
investors a say on the investment,453 and (2) allowing investors to commit 
capital in stages—i.e., to withhold a portion of the investment if the 
managers underperform,454 and exit if the going gets rough.455  These 
mechanisms are conspicuously absent from traditional private equity contract 
designs.456  Fund investors have no real voice in managing the funds they 
own.457  And, while staged investments—a form of exit where initial capital 
commitments are only partially funded up front—are the norm, funds punish 
cold-footed investors by diluting their positions.458  In addition, the 
reputational costs of defaulting on a capital call are high—investors who 
renege on their commitments might find themselves frozen out of future 
funds.459 
In contrast, SPAC entrepreneurs broke the private equity mold by 
allowing their investors both voice and exit.  As to voice, shareholders had a 
formal vote on a proposed acquisition and a second de facto vote via the 
conversion threshold.460  And SPAC investors enjoyed not only the liquidity 
 
                                                                                                             
453See supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing the SPAC shareholders' voting 
rights).  
454See Douglas S. Ellenoff, Generation III—The New Mechanics of SPACs, ELLENOFF 
GROSSMAN & SCHOLE LLP, 11 (2010), http://www.egsllp.com/DSESPACArticle.pdf (describing 
a SPAC's "redemption threshold").   
455See supra note 177 (discussing the SPAC shareholders' rights to receive their money back 
if they vote against the acquisition); see also Riemer, supra note 45, at 960 ("[T]he worst-case 
scenario for SPAC investors is that they are refunded the portion of their initial investment that had 
been accruing interest in escrow, instead of the more dramatic potential returns of a merger.").  
456See supra notes 87-88, 137 and accompanying text (stating that investors in venture and 
LBO funds have limited rights).  
457See supra notes 87-88, 137.  
458See, e.g., Stephen Harris, Overlooking Private Equity Partnerships Can Be Costly 
Mistake Secondary Market Offers Liquidity for Limited Partners, TURNAROUND MGMT. ASS'N 
(Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=6735 ("Once a 
limited partner makes a commitment to a fund, it cannot withdraw or otherwise discontinue its 
participation without incurring onerous penalties.").  
459See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Two "Cycles" of Venture Capital, 28 J. CORP. L. 419, 
421 (2003) (describing how both GPs and LPs are incentivized to avoid developing a negative 
reputation).   
460See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 45, at 954-55 ("Unless a majority of investors affirmatively 
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of publicly traded stock, but also the guarantee of 85% of their initial 
investment if they held until acquisition or dissolution.461  These powerful 
investor protections made the investment vehicle attractive to initial 
investors, but turned out to make it much harder to get a deal done (i.e., to 
actually acquire a target).462  Without reputational constraints limiting 
investor opportunism, SPAC managers found themselves vulnerable to 
holdup.463   
To orient readers, we remind them of some key historical dates.  From 
the beginning of the second wave of SPACs in May 2003, SPACs grew 
steadily in number until July 1, 2005, when AMEX began to list them on its 
exchange.464  The form then exploded, with sixty-seven S-1s filed leading to 
fifty-five IPOs in 2005, forty-seven S-1s and thirty-five IPOs in 2006, and 
seventy-four S-1s leading to forty-four IPOs in 2007.465  The NYSE and 
NASDAQ allowed SPACs to list in 2008, but the financial crisis meant that 
very few SPACS were formed after the second quarter of 2008, and fewer 
still went public.466 
In the post-crisis period, SPACs have reemerged from dormancy.467  
These new SPACs have developed significantly different provisions to 
respond to the problems of hedge fund vote gaming and greenmailing.468  
One SPAC, 57th Street General Acquisition Corporation, went public in 
2009, and in May 2011 it acquired Crumbs Holdings LLC, a New York-
based gourmet cupcake seller.469  Seven other SPACS went public in 2010 
                                                                                                             
approve a combination, and less than twenty percent of investors vote against the combination, the 
fund is dissolved and investors are entitled to a pro rata share of the escrow account.").  
461See id. at 945 & n.96 (stating that 85-95% was the amount in trust); id. at 954-55 (stating 
how the investor's input determines the outcome of the SPAC).  
462Neuhauser, supra note 367 ("One of the main impediments in consummating 
SPACquisitions in 2008/09 was the redemption threshold which provided that a business 
combination could not proceed unless a majority of the public shareholders approved a deal and that 
no more than 30% (or some other specified %) of the public shareholders requested their capital 
returned.").  
463See supra notes 62, 190 and accompanying text. 
464See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text. 
465See supra note 239 and accompanying text; infra Table 4.  
466See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.  
467See supra note 243 and accompanying text.  
468See supra note 207 (discussing the "greenmailing" problem); Neuhauser, supra note 367 
(describing how modern SPACs are evolving); see also Friedmann & Larson, supra note 62 
("While conventional IPO investors eschewed SPAC offerings, many hedge funds sought out SPAC 
investments.  These hedge funds appear to have been attracted to SPACs by the opportunity to 
profit on their investments through arbitrage trading strategies, rather than a buy and hold 
approach."). 
46957th Street General Acquisition Corp., Owner of Crumbs Holdings LLC, Announces 
Changes to Its Ticker Symbols, CRUMBS BAKE SHOP (May 10, 2011), http://investors.crumbs.com/ 
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(and twenty-two in 2011), but it is too soon to tell if they will complete 
acquisitions.470  We include the characteristics of this third generation of 
SPACs471 in Table 4 below, but (with the exception of 57th Street) these 
SPACs have emerged too recently for us to provide data on outcomes. 
The public nature of SPACs allows us to track at a granular level 
SPACs' grand experiment in giving public investors voice and exit.472  
Outside the sheltered confines of traditional private equity, the market 
provided continuous feedback into which features of the SPAC contract 
design worked – and which did not.473 
TABLE 4.   MEAN CHARACTERISTICS OF SPACS BY YEAR 
PRELIMINARY PROSPECTUS IS FILED 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
IPO proceeds ($mil) $22 $39 $76 $104 $238 $181 $50 $78 $92 
Unit price $6.00 $6.32 $7.17 $7.74 $9.55 $9.74 $10.00 $8.57 $10.00 
Warrant strike price $5.00 $5.00 $5.34 $5.80 $6.68 $7.18 $11.50 $9.56 $10.89 
Strike prc. >  
Unit prc. 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 71% 78% 
Months for combo 24.0 23.1 23.5 24.0 26.8 28.9 15.0 21.4 23.0 
Conversion 
threshold 20.0% 20.0% 20.7% 23.9% 32.5% 35.1% 88.0% 63.3% 74.4% 
% in trust 85.0% 86.2% 93.2% 97.7% 99% 99% 100% 97.2% 100% 
Pvt. place./ 
IPO prcds. 0% 0% 1.4% 3.2% 3.1% 3.0% 3.7% 3.0% 4.3% 
% listed on OTC  100% 100% 68.7% 31.9% 14.9% 12.8% 100% 85.7% 77.8% 
No IPO 0.0% 0.0% 17.9% 25.5% 40.5% 100% - - - 
IPO, no acquisition 0.0% 23.1% 28.4% 46.8% 25.7% 0.0% - - - 
Acquisition 100% 76.9% 53.7% 27.7% 33.8% 0.0% - - - 
N 3 13 67 47 74 39 1 7 22 
Total other IPOs474  62 174 160 157 160 21 41 96 NA 
                                                                                                             
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=575644.  
470See infra Table 4.  
471See Neuhauser, supra note 367 (referring to modern SPACs as "Generation III SPACs").  
472See id. (stating that "the resurgence [of SPACs] is due to the new structure of Generation 
III SPACs first introduced in May 2010 with 57th Street Acquisition Corp's IPO . . . .") (emphasis 
added).  
473See id.   
474Jay Ritter provides data on non-SPAC IPOs.  He includes only IPOs with an offer price 
of $5.00 or more; excluding ADRs, unit offerings (thus excluding all firms in our sample), closed-
end funds, REITs, partnerships, banks, S&Ls, and stocks not listed on CRSP.  Jay R. Ritter, Initial 
Public Offerings: Tables Updated Through 2010, 1-2 (Jan. 27, 2011), http://bear.warrington.ufl. 
edu/ritter/IPOs2010Statistics111.pdf.  
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A.  Voice 
Venture investors have little say over the individual investment 
choices of fund managers.475  Some funds establish advisory boards, which 
may have limited partner representation.476  Still, Professor Ronald J. Gilson 
terms these boards "largely inconsequential."477  The GP has "virtually 
complete control."478  
The same is true in buyout funds.  Indeed "[t]he reason for choosing 
the limited partnership form is principally to limit the control rights that 
limited partners will have over the partnership."479  Investors in the buyout 
fund usually do not have much voting power.480  These investors typically 
lack even the right to replace poorly performing managers.481  In the few 
cases when an LP has control rights, she might have a "general reluctance" 
to exercise them.482  As Spindler explains, "[m]any of the investors are repeat 
players, such as funds-of-funds, insurance companies, pensions, and other 
institutional investors, and do not want to acquire reputations as 
troublemakers, which would deny them investment opportunities in the 
future."483 
In contrast, early SPACs provided robust control rights to investors.  
First, these SPACs required a majority of shareholders to approve the 
proposed acquisition in order for the acquisition to go through.484  Second, 
even if a majority of shareholders approved the transaction, individual 
shareholders who voted against it could exercise their right to receive their 
pro rata portion of the escrowed funds if the combination occurred (a "put 
right" or "right of rescission").485  This redemption right translated into a 
 
                                                                                                             
475See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 88, at 1088 ("Most important, the investors are prohibited 
from insisting on an approval right of the GP's investment decisions.").   
476See id.  
477Id.   
478Id.  
479Spindler, supra note 133, at 328.  
480Ribstein, supra note 150, at 299.  
481See Spindler, supra note 133,  at 328-29 ("[T]he limited partner has very little control 
over what that capital is used for and usually very little right to replace management—or other such 
remedies—subsequent to poor performance.").  Private equity limited partners can step in, however, 
"upon some fairly major event, such as the departure of key management personnel of the general 
partner or the bad actions of the general partner."  Id. at 329. 
482Id. at 330.  
483Id.   
484See Riemer, supra note 45, at 961-62.  
485See, e.g., id. at 945-46, 961 (noting a SPAC investor's "right of rescission" after the 
acquisition is announced).  
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secondary veto power because most SPACs specified that if a given 
percentage of shares (the "conversion threshold") voted to redeem their 
shares from the trust account, the acquisition would not go forward486—
effectively imposing a supermajority approval requirement.487   
Most early SPACs hewed to a 20% conversion threshold.488  Looking 
at Table 1 above, the lowest threshold observed was 20%; but within our 
sample, 110 SPACs used this threshold.  Notably, each of these 110 entities 
was formed prior to February of 2007.489  Table 1 shows that that the median 
conversion threshold for all entities, including those formed in later years, is 
30%.  The NYSE and NASDAQ both require that the threshold be no more 
than 40%.490  The average conversion threshold in our sample in Table 1 
above is 27.2%.  As seen in Table 4 above, the mean conversion threshold 
did not rise above 30% until 2007; and not until 2009 was the average above 
50%.   
Why have these changes occurred?  These shareholder approval 
provisions were important in convincing the SEC to allow SPACs to go 
public,491 but they created an unintended consequence: a holdout right.492  
During the recent financial crisis, investors became desperate for havens in 
which to invest their money.493  SPACs' trust funds provided a safe harbor 
 
                                                                                                             
486See supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining the investor's "conversion right").  
487See Joe Barbeau et al., Deal-Breakers, DAILY J.: FOCUS COLUMN 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/Deal-Breakers.aspx (identifying the "difficulty 
[in] getting supermajority approval (usually, 80 percent is required)" as a problem inherent in 
SPACs).  
488See Riemer, supra note 45, at 954-55.  
489See, e.g., Pantheon China Acquisition Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 7 
(Aug. 14, 2006) ("We will proceed with a business combination only if (i) a majority of the shares 
of common stock voted by the public stockholders are voted in favor of the business combination 
and (ii) public stockholders owning less than 20% of the shares sold in this offering exercise their 
conversion rights . . . .").  
490Barker & Pflaum, supra note 381, at 5.  
491See Bonenfant, supra note 194 ("Historically, the SEC has been concerned about 
development stage company filings as evidenced by the adoption of Rule 419.  This concern is also 
reflected in the SEC's review of the structural elements and features of SPAC offerings.").  
492See supra note 62 and accompanying text.  
493See Harvey Jones, No Guaranteed Safety in Financial Safe Havens, THE NAT'L (May 5, 
2012), http://www.thenational.ae/lifestyle/person-finance/no-guaranteed-safety-in-financial-safe-
havens ("In these troubled times, safety first is the motto for many investors.  Nobody wants to lose 
all their money in another banking, property, stock market or currency crash.  Yet the world is 
running out of safe havens.").  Readers may remember that even money market funds began to seem 
risky.  After the oldest money market in the United States, the Reserve Primary Fund, "broke the 
buck" (i.e., cut its share price to below $1.00), the Treasury Department stepped in to backstop these 
investments.  Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled 
Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1740-41 (2011).  
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that made SPACs an increasingly attractive investment, regardless whether 
an acquisition took place.494  Indeed, it was around this time that reports of 
"greenmailing" emerged, as hedge funds realized that they could use the 
power of withholding approval votes to gain concessions from SPAC 
managers eager to close a deal.495  The business form then all but 
disappeared.496  Not a single SPAC IPO occurred in all of 2008.497 
In more recent years, SPACs have recreated themselves and 
reemerged, addressing the problem of shareholder voice by taking it away.498 
 57th Street General Acquisition Corp., (“57th Street”), the first of these new 
generation SPACs,499 provides a good example of the changing nature of 
SPACs.  The prospectus for 57th Street has no requirement of shareholder 
approval by vote.500  Instead, it employs a tender offer mechanism, offering to 
buy shares back from shareholders unhappy with the proposed transaction.501 
The tender offer removes the holdup value from would-be hedge-fund 
arbitrageurs; they can no longer threaten a negative vote to gain 
consideration from the SPAC.502  If they want to cash out, they must put up 
their shares.503  57th Street retains the conversion threshold concept, but the 
level is high: the holders of more than 88% of shares must tender their shares 
 
                                                                                                             
494See The Cauldron: Healthcare Costs, Pension Funds, LBOs, SPACs and PIKs, THE 
ECON. POPULIST, http://www.economicpopulist.org/content/cauldron-healthcare-costs-pension-
funds-lbos-spacs-and-piks ("The recent popularity of SPACs, which are a controversial 
investment class due to their high risk characteristics, . . . appears due almost wholly to investor 
demand for 'private equity-type' investment.").  
495See, e.g., Jonathan Keehner, For Blank-Check IPOs, Popularity Comes At a Price, 
REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USN2465188420080225 
(discussing the issue of "activist investors" in SPACs completing acquisitions).  
496See supra note 241 and accompanying text.  
497See supra note 242 and accompanying text.  
498See Neuhauser, supra note 367 (stating that modern SPACs have "do[ne] away with the 
shareholder approval process").  
499See supra note 472.  
500See 57th St. Gen. Acquisition Corp., Form S-1, supra note 333, at 58.  
501Id. ("Unless otherwise required by law, our stockholders will not have the opportunity 
to vote on our business transaction.  In the event we are required to seek stockholder approval in 
connection with our initial business transaction, we will send each stockholder a proxy statement 
containing information required by the SEC.").  
502See Order, supra note 190, 2010 WL 5301044, at *5-*6 (ruling that SPACs may pursue 
the tender offer route if they wish).  
503See 57th St. Gen. Acquisition Corp, Form S-1, supra note 333, at 58 ("[A] stockholder 
who follows the procedures described in the proxy statement will be given the right to put his shares 
of common stock to us for a pro rata share of the trust account.").  Note that the initial 
mechanism described was a "put right," but the SEC required 57th Street to conduct a tender 
offer.  See id.  
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in order for the business combination to fail.504  If fewer than the 88% 
threshold amount of shareholders tender their shares, the deal goes 
through.505  Furthermore, 57th Street included a "bulldog provision,"506 
restricting the right to tender shares to holders of less than 10% of the 
shares.507  The S-1 observed:  
We believe this restriction will discourage stockholders from 
accumulating large blocks of shares, and subsequent attempts 
by such holders to use their put right as a means to force us or 
our management to purchase their shares at a significant 
premium to the then current market price or on other 
undesirable terms.508   
Our data show this evolution.  As seen in Table 4 above, in the post-
2007 period, the lowest average conversion threshold is 63.3% in 2010, with 
the highest conversion threshold set at 88% for the lone SPAC of 2009 we 
observed.  This change has shifted power over acquisition decisions to 
SPAC managers in a dramatic way.509  We argue in Part VIII of this Article 
that this loss of the vote occurred because the vote became more trouble than 
it was worth to shareholders, given the other protections SPACs afforded 
their investment.  The next section explains why. 
B.  Exit 
Exit refers to the ability to get out of an investment that has gone 
sour.510  Venture and buyout funds provide their investors with limited exit 
rights—or at least, the right to limit their losses by staging their 
investments.511  However, exercising the right not to contribute further can 
 
                                                                                                             
50457th St. Gen. Acquisition Corp, Form S-1, supra note 333, at 52. 
505See id.  
506This term is coined after Bulldog Investors.  See Ted Wallace, Hedge Fund Activism 
Extends to SPACs, HARV. LAW SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Feb. 1, 2009, 
10:03 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/02/01/hedge-fund-activism-extends-to-
spacs/#more-840 ("[M]any SPACs now incorporate a 'bulldog' provision – preventing any investor 
(or group) from holding more than 10% of the shell company to exercise conversion rights (and thus 
force the scuttle of an already-approved merger).").  
507See 57th St. Gen. Acquisition Corp, Form S-1, supra note 333, at 11.  
508Id.   
509See supra notes 498-508 and accompanying text.  
510See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 56, at 4.  
511See Litvak, Governance Through Exit, supra note 9, at 772-73 (stating that venture 
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be costly.512  Professor Kate Litvak has documented the punitive dilution that 
funds impose for failure to invest more.513  In addition, the reputational costs 
of failing to meet capital calls is often steep because investors tend to be 
repeat players who can be cut out of later transactions.514  In short, the hold-
back right in traditional private equity imposes some discipline upon poorly 
performing managers, but it is a weak right at best. 515 
In contrast to traditional private equity, SPACs provide investors a 
highly meaningful form of exit.  SPACs characteristically agree to hold 90% 
or more of the offering proceeds in escrow, as Rule 419 requires.516  These 
funds in turn cannot be used for the company's day-to-day operations 
(although the interest earned thereon may be),517 and must be invested in 
government obligations or treasury securities.518  To protect the trust value, 
SPACs generally obtain waivers from vendors and targets on any claims to 
the escrowed funds.519  As seen in Table 1 above, the percent held in trust 
ranges from a low of 82.8% to a high of 110%, with a mean and median of 
96.3% and 98%, respectively.  Most of these percentages exceed those 
required by the AMEX (which requires that at least 85% of the funds be 
placed in escrow)520 and the NASDAQ and NYSE (which set a 90% 
threshold).521  If the SPAC fails to locate a target and gain shareholder 
approval for that target’s acquisition, then each shareholder receives a pro 
                                                                                                             
capitalist can stage their investments).  
512See id. (stating that a venture capitalist investor's default may be unwise).  
513See id. at 808-09 (explaining the factors that correlate with "weaker investor walkaway 
rights").  
514See Victor Fleischer, Fickle Investors, Reputation, and the Clientele Effect in Venture 
Capital Funds, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 813, 817 (2004).  
515See id.  We can find little data on whether buyout funds also stage investments and 
impose similar punishments on investors who fail to meet capital calls, but several sources indicate 
that this is the case.  See, e.g., Spindler, supra note 133, at 330 ("[E]ven where some degree of 
control exists, there appears to be a general reluctance to exert control rights.").  
516Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 758.  
517See, e.g., HCM Acquisition Co., Form S-1, supra note 186, at 79 (noting that interest 
income may be used to pay income taxes and up to $3 million can fund working capital 
requirements).  
51817 C.F.R. §§ 230.419(b)(2)(i)-(iv) (2011).  
519William H. Hinman, Jr., Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations, in SPECIAL 
PURPOSE ACQUISITION CORPORATIONS, at 510 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook 
Series, No. 14864, 2008); see also Bank St. Telecom Funding Corp., Form S-1, supra note 185,  
at 9. 
520Mark Cecil, State Attorneys General: Set to Attack SPACs, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 
REPORT, at 1 (Aug. 22, 2005).  
521Camille Formosa et al., SPACs 2.0: New SPAC Rules Changes Approved By NASDAQ 
And NYSE AMEX And New Market Features Make SPACs A More Attractive Investment Vehicle In 
2011, MARTINDALE.COM (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.martindale.com/securities-law/article_Shep 
pard-Mullin-Richter-Hampton-LLP_1258884.htm.  
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rata share of these escrowed funds.522  Thus, the more funds that a SPAC can 
hold in trust, the more attractive a SPAC will become to an investor—the 
higher the percentage in trust, the less risk to the investment.523  
As demonstrated in Table 4 above, this avoidance of loss makes the 
(unreported) standard deviation of 4.5% a non-trivial amount of variation 
when viewed as a percentage loss over a 24-month period.  As the table 
shows, there is an increase in the average percent of proceeds kept in the 
trust account, rising in a linear fashion from a low of 85% in 2003 to an 
average of 99% in 2007 and 2008.  In 2009 and 2011 the average is 100%, 
while it is 97.2% in 2010.   
This average percent of the proceeds from the IPO increases due to 
two sources of cash. The first is private placements of warrants by managers, 
which was discussed in Part VI.A of this Article—the "skin in the game."524  
In Table 4 above, we show that these private placements began to appear in 
SPAC offerings in 2005 and now represent a relatively small, but growing, 
proportion of proposed IPO proceeds, ranging from a low of 1.4% in 2005 to 
a high of 4.3% in 2011.  Second, SPAC underwriters began offering to defer 
a portion of their compensation until the hoped-for acquisition actually 
closed.525  Underwriters are generally quite resistant to negotiating down this 
portion of their compensation—the so-called "discount" at which they buy 
the shares from the corporation before selling them to the public at full 
price.526  In future work we will explore the implications of the banks' 
willingness to defer this typically fixed portion of underwriter compensation.  
As the SPAC evolved, the trust account became more and more 
important.527  The ability to offer investors an increasingly "cheap look" at an 
investment, if not an entirely "free look," apparently outweighed the loss of 
 
                                                                                                             
522See Riemer, supra note 45, at 954-55.  
523See Barker & Hedin, supra note 43, at 38.  
524See supra Part VI.A.2.  
525Heyman, supra note 401, at 546.  
526See Riemer, supra note 45, at 954 n.162 ("An investor's pro rata share is equal to the total 
amount of funds held in escrow, plus any interest earned, less any amount held in escrow 
representing a portion of the underwriter's discount . . . .") (emphasis added); Andres Rueda, The 
Hot IPO Phenomenon and the Great Internet Bust, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 21, 30-31 (2001) 
("[U]nder the cartel-like price structure that prevailed among the half-dozen or so market players that 
dominated investment banking during the Internet boom, the usual fee was a flat, non-negotiable 
seven percent underwriter's discount.").  
527See Neuhauser, supra note 367 (stating that in modern SPACs, "from the investor point 
of view, all of the funds continue to be protected in a trust account and they continue to be provided 
with the right to a return of their capital").  
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protections afforded by shareholder voting rights.528  From the firm's 
perspective, the trust account provides a pool of collective capital that serves 
as currency for an acquisition and a check on managerial discretion.529  
SPACs generally finance their acquisitions using a combination of the 
unclaimed capital in the trust account and newly issued stock.530  Even in 
Third Generation SPACs, where the conversion threshold is high, if too 
many SPAC shareholders tender their shares, then the scant equity available 
for the deal might well make targets reluctant to go through with the 
acquisition.531  The threat of this reluctance will, in turn, discipline fund 
managers to pursue those deals built around maximizing shareholder 
returns.532 
In sum, SPAC entrepreneurs enticed would-be investors by offering 
voice and exit, two notable deviations from the traditional private equity 
contract design.  The voice experiment fell prey to investor opportunism; 
unconstrained by reputation, empowered investors quickly morphed into 
holdup artists.533  Exit, however, proved to be a valuable constraint on 
managers by giving unhappy investors the right to walk away.534  
 
                                                                                                             
528See id.; see also Dennis Dick, Can the J-Shaped Liquidity Curve Write a Prescription?, 
CFA MAGAZINE, 28 (Sept.-Oct. 2011), available at http://premarketinfo.com/in-the-media/ 
(discussing a general "cheap look").  The trust account can fruitfully be viewed in a number of ways. 
From the perspective of the individual investor, it creates a kind of option on a subsequent, yet-to-
be-determined acquisition.  See Neuhauser, supra note 367.  The option takes an unusual form, in 
that the full purchase price is paid up front: what the initial investor buys is a robust option to 
abandon the investment, that is, to receive almost all her money back if she dislikes the acquisition 
the SPAC management proposes.  See Riemer, supra note 45, at 954 & n.162, 955 (explaining what 
the dissenting investor receives).  Looked at in this way, for the purchase of a SPAC with a unit 
price of $10.00 and a trust value of $9.75, $0.25 is the price for the option to abandon the 
investment.  See Tim Jenkinson & Miguel Sousa, Why SPAC Investors Should Listen to the Market, 
at *10 (February 12, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1331383.  But SPAC shares are 
traded publicly, and as such present daily opportunities to sell—in that sense, the option to abandon 
is inherent in being publicly listed.  See id.  
529See Order, supra note 190, 2010 WL 5301044, at *3 ("[S]PACs often use stock as 
consideration for the business combination and cash in the trust account is used to redeem 
shareholders and possibly finance the operation of the target.").  
530See id.   
531See Wittlin & Ferris, supra note 241, at 4 ("Some SPAC targets, however, may not wish 
to close a transaction with a SPAC that has substantially less cash than originally anticipated, even if 
the ownership percentage of the SPAC's shares by the target's stockholders is increased to reflect 
the reduced amount of cash in the SPAC.").   
532See id.   
533See supra notes 485-88, 495 and accompanying text.  
534See supra note 528 and accompanying text.  
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C.  The Case of EarlyBirdCapital, Inc.535 
Before we move to consider the implications of the changes in 
contractual design that we see in SPACs, we must consider one question: 
does the change we observe in SPAC structure result from the entry of new 
investment banks, bringing with them idiosyncratic innovations to SPAC 
structures, or is it a more widespread change in the way that SPACs are 
structured in response to competitive pressures?  The answer to this question 
is important; if the change is due to new entrants, then any argument that 
SPAC structure has evolved for particular reasons (i.e., problems of hedge 
fund vote gaming and "greenmailing")536 is weak.  New, innovative SPACs 
might exist side by side with old-style SPACs, resulting in an aggregate of 
data and creating the illusion of evolution from mere multiplicity.  However, 
if we observe the structure of SPACs changing for a particular underwriter 
over time, then the argument for this change being attributable to general 
evolution, instead of mere diversity of industry, becomes more convincing. 
In Table 5 below, we examine the characteristics of SPACs in which 
the lead underwriter is EarlyBirdCapital—the innovator, and second most 
prolific lead underwriter, of SPACs in our sample period.537  Most of the 
characteristics of EarlyBirdCapital's deals exhibit the same shift as the 
general SPAC population.538  For example, as seen from the table, the 
conversion threshold for EarlyBirdCapital transactions remained at or near 
20% until 2007 and 2008, when it doubled to 40%.  In the three transactions 
after this period, in 2010 and 2011, the conversion threshold increased to 
80% and 90%, respectively.  
 
                                                                                                             
535The SPAC is actually a trademark of EarlyBirdCapital, Inc.  See SPAC, 
EARLYBIRDCAPITAL, http://www.earlybirdcapital.com/spacs.html (last visited Sept 14, 2012).  
536See supra note 495 and accompanying text.  
537See ICR To Host Conference Call To Discuss Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, 
BUSINESSWIRE (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ICR to Host], http://www.businesswire.com/ 
news/home/20060130005545/en/ICR-Host-Conference-Call-Discuss-Special-Purpose (stating that 
the SPAC is "a trademark of EarlyBirdCapital Inc.").  
538Compare supra Table 4 (presenting characteristics of general SPACs) with infra Table 5 
(presenting characteristics of EarlyBirdCapital, Inc. specifically).  
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TABLE 5.   MEAN SPAC CHARACTERISTICS WHEN 
EARLYBIRDCAPITAL, INC. IS LEAD UNDERWRITER 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
IPO proceeds ($mil) $21.0 $27.4 $41.2 $41.1 $66.3 $49.0 - $44.3 $50.0 
Unit price $6.0 $6.0 $6.0 $6.6 $8.0 $8.0 - $6.0 $10.0 
Warrant strike price $5.0 $5.0 $5.0 $5.0 $5.4 $6.0 - $6.0 $7.5 
Strike prc. > Unit prc. 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% - 50% 0% 
Months for combo 24 24 24 24 27 30 - 22.5 24 
Conversion threshold 20% 20% 20% 23% 40% 40% - 80% 90% 
% in trust 85% 85.8% 87.7% 95.2% 99.3% 97.2% - 97.7% 101% 
Pvt. place./IPO prcds. 0% 0% 0.3% 3.9% 4.5% 2.1% - 2.4% 6.2% 
% listed on the OTC  100% 100% 88.9% 100% 75.0% 100% - 50% 0% 
N 2 7 9 7 4 2 0 2 1 
 
In addition, as the statistics suggest, the ability to offer investors a 
relatively riskless investment with significant upside potential became more 
important in EarlyBirdCapital transactions, just as it gained in importance in 
the full sample of SPACs, as shown in Table 4 above.  As seen in Table 5, 
the percent held in trust increased each year from 85% in 2003 to 99.3% in 
2007 and again from 97.2% in 2008 to 101% in 2011.  As suggested above, 
these increases came alongside increased participation by managers in the 
form of private placements,539 which Table 5 shows first appeared in the 
EarlyBird transactions in 2005.  Also noticeable from the data is that the 
percent of the private placement amount relative to the amount of IPO 
proceeds increased over time: moving from 0% to 4.5% from 2003 to 2007, 
and from 2.1% to 6.2% from 2008 to 2011. 
On the whole, the characteristics of the SPACs underwritten by 
EarlyBird in Table 5 change in the same manner as that of the general 
population of SPACs in Table 4.  This pattern for EarlyBird is consistent 
with the changing of SPAC structure to eliminate the vote and increase the 
percentage held in trust.540  Therefore, we conclude that the pattern we see of 
emphasizing exit and discounting voice is an industry-wide phenomenon. 
Of additional importance is the lack of speed with which EarlyBird 
modified its SPAC structures, which suggests that SPACs' structural 
evolution was driven, in part, through competition.541  Though EarlyBird 
 
                                                                                                             
539See supra notes 369-71 and accompanying text.  
540See supra Part VII.A-B.  
541See ICR to Host, supra note 537 ("While EarlyBirdCapital was the early leader in 
 
918 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 37 
 
 
introduced the SPAC structure, it was slow to change.542  EarlyBird was the 
lead underwriter for five of the first six, and fourteen of the first thirty, 
SPACs.543  However, it was the third underwriter to list its SPAC on a more 
prominent exchange than the OTC and did not do so until its thirteenth 
transaction.544  Only after fourteen transactions by other underwriters with 
conversion thresholds greater than 20% did EarlyBird underwrite an IPO 
with a conversion threshold in this higher range.545  Only after twenty-seven 
transactions by other underwriters with trust accounts greater than 90% did 
EarlyBird follow suit—it was its eighteenth SPAC in our sample period.546  
Last, it was the twelfth firm to underwrite a SPAC in which there was a 
private placement of shares.547  Thus, one can reasonably conclude that 
competition for the underwriting services to SPACs, and the associated fees, 
is a primary driver of the observed changes in SPAC structure.  The initial 
innovator changed the features of its original template in response to outside 
pressures.548  We plan to focus future work on the insights SPACs provide on 
the role of the underwriter in the public offering. 
VIII.  IMPLICATIONS: REPUTATION, VOICE, AND EXIT 
SPAC entrepreneurs had a revolutionary idea.  They took the 
delicately balanced, emphatically private, financial contract between private 
equity investor and manager and transplanted it to the public market.  This 
radical move promised new opportunities for all.  Fund managers who either 
chafed in the confines of the traditional private equity fund structure or who 
had a limited track record would be free to pursue their own deals, unfettered 
by the demands of established private equity funds.549  The general public 
would finally get a chance to invest in funds that take private companies 
public.550  Lastly, targets would have a cheaper method to access the capital 
markets.551 
                                                                                                             
brining SPACs to market, many other investment banks . . . have recently priced deals.").  
542See id. (detailing the history of SPACs).  
543See id. ("In 1993 and 1994 Early[B]ird Capital[] took 13 SPACs public, only one of 
which was liquidated."); see also Completed SPAC Offerings, EARLYBIRDCAPITAL, 
http://www.earlybirdcapital.com/offerings.html (listing post-2003 SPACs).  
544See supra Table 5. 
545See supra Table 5.  
546See supra Table 5.   
547See supra Table 5.   
548See supra Table 5, note 541 and accompanying text.  
549See supra note 204 and accompanying text.  
550See supra note 203 and accompanying text.  
551See supra note 205 and accompanying text.  
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Things didn't work out as expected.  We argue in this Part that 
reputation was the vital private equity ingredient SPACs could not recreate 
in the public market.  The "one-shot deal" nature of the SPAC removed the 
reputational constraint on fund managers, and the public nature of the 
markets eliminated the reputational constraint on investors.552  The financial 
contract was forced to develop substitutes for reputation;553 it remains to be 
seen how successful these substitutes will prove.   
Finally, we explore what light SPACs shed on the relationship 
between voice and exit.  Hirschman posited in 1970 that the easier the ability 
to exit, the less likely that the power of voice will be exercised.554  Recent 
literature suggests that, although conventional wisdom is that voting in the 
typical corporation is of little value, voting in mutual funds may be even less 
effective because exit is relatively easier.555  The elimination of the SPAC 
acquisition vote contributes empirical evidence to support the claim that 
shareholders are indifferent to a vote if the exit is cheap enough. 
First we turn to the role of reputation.  Thus far, we have focused, by 
design, on the investor/fund contract.  This focus has given us a somewhat 
distorted perspective because prospective private equity investors are 
focused on the probability of success on the fund, which ultimately depends 
on the success of the underlying portfolio.556  As Part II discussed, Ron 
Gilson describes the crucial role of reputation in the "braided" relationships 
between investor/fund and fund/portfolio-company.557  Funds do not 
exploit the companies they invest in because if traditional funds act 
opportunistically, they will not be able to make further investments and, 
ultimately, will not be able to raise subsequent funds.558  Because private 
equity companies' business model hinges on raising multiple funds and 
capitalizing on scale and scope economies, reputation matters.559   
SPACs are new—the first SPAC sponsors had no reputation, at least 
regarding this new form.560  Moreover, SPACs are one-shot, especially 
 
                                                                                                             
552See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.  
553See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text; Neuhauser, supra note 367.  
554See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 56, at 34.  
555See Morley & Curtis, supra note 61, at 89-90. 
556See supra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.  
557See supra notes 152-53.  
558Gilson, supra note 88, at 1092. 
559See supra Part II.C.  
560See Karen Richardson & Peter Lattman, Financiers Now Say 'Trust Us' Like the Blank-
Check Companies of Yore, SPAC Investors Are Asked to Buy In – on Faith, THE WALL STREET J., 2 
Feb. 1, 2007, available at http://www.ladenburg.com/uploads/LTS%2002-01-07.pdf (stating that 
investors use a strategy called "bet on the jockey," in which everything hinges on the identity of the 
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compared to traditional private equity, and so reputation does not constrain 
managers.561  While return SPAC entrepreneurs do exist, when each SPAC is 
launched there is no expectation of a follow-up by the same managers.562  
Prospective target companies have little reputational capital to rely upon 
when considering whether to consent to acquisition by a SPAC.563  
A revealing sign of the importance of reputation is that, after the first wave 
of SPACs, prospectuses were quick to inform investors when their managers 
had successfully led SPACs in the past, as opposed to simply relying on past 
business success.564  
We interpret the evolution in SPAC managerial compensation as a 
response to the need for a substitute for reputational capital.  One striking 
takeaway from our data is the extent to which the original SPAC template 
hewed to the "magic 20%" compensation for managers: 211 of our 260 
SPACs, or 81% of our sample, receive exactly 20% of the corporation, and 
19 more are within 5% of that number.565  This marked clustering around 
20% indicates that the SPAC sponsors aspire to be like their traditional 
private equity cousins, and expect to be compensated accordingly.566  
Particularly since they are not charging a 2% management fee to investors,567 
the 20% incentive, analogous to private equity's "carry,"568 seemed vital at 
the outset.      
And yet 20% awarded solely for a single acquisition proved overly 
generous for the market.  As discussed below, the market evolved in two 
ways:  first, it required the managers to stump up the "skin in the game" they 
originally left out.  Second, it has begun to condition the managerial 20% on 
more concrete performance. 
                                                                                                             
managers because nothing is known about actual SPAC).  
561See Thompson, supra note 33, at 12-13 ("[U]nlike private equity managers, SPAC 
sponsors are not necessarily going back to investors to raise funds again.  Sponsors infrequently 
express the intent to maintain an active role in the acquired firm, and have the easy option of 
returning full time to the outside employment that they have maintained throughout their tenure 
with the SPAC.").  
562See id.   
563See Heyman, supra note 401, at 533-34 (stating that under the "bet on the jockey" theory, 
"high profile names that are likely to attract investment" are really the only thing the SPAC has 
going for it).  
564See, e.g., Aldabra 4 Acquisition Corp., Form S-1, supra note 439, at 70 ("Each of our 
executive officers and certain of our directors has been involved in other blank check companies.").  
565See supra Part VI.A.1.  
566See, e.g., Sahlman, supra note 9, at 491 (stating that in venture capital funds, 20% is the 
norm).  
567See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 45, at 959 (citation omitted) ("SPAC managers do not 
receive salaried compensation or management fee.").  
568See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text. 
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Beginning with the "skin in the game," at first the SPAC sponsors 
only paid a nominal amount for their 20% interest.569  Perhaps they, like 
some scholars, viewed the 1% managerial investment in venture capital and 
LBO funds to be an "artifact of tax history,"570 and therefore dispensable.  In 
contrast, now the sponsors invest significant capital, which they forfeit if a 
business combination does not materialize.571  The SPAC sponsors now pay 
for the funds' operating expenses, allowing the trust account to grow to ever 
higher levels.572  In effect, they are now posting a bond as to their own 
performance; exposed to a downside risk, they reassure investors that they 
too have personal assets at stake.573   
As discussed, there is some debate as to the importance of skin in the 
game in the traditional private equity contract.574  In SPACs it is vital.  SPAC 
managers risk their reputations to some degree, but because they are one-
shot transactions, investors cannot rely on the built-up reputational capital of 
prior funds and other funds from the same company.575  A manager's 
personal investment thus became a bond, ensuring that the promoters risked 
losing something of real value.576  This reassurance matters both to SPAC 
investors and to targets. 
Another recent SPAC development, the imposition of performance 
hurdles, similarly substitutes for reputation.  The founders of the newest 
SPACs will forfeit their shares unless the stock price attains certain preset 
levels.577  Thus, the managers receive their full 20%, not when the target is 
 
                                                                                                             
569See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 45, at 959 (discussing management compensation within 
the SPAC).  
570Fleischer, supra note 100, at 82 n.25 ("Before the check-the-box rules, a 1% capital 
interest was necessary to help ensure partnership classification for tax purposes."); see also 
Sahlman, supra note 9, at 488 ("Typically, the general partners provide only a small proportion 
(about 1%) of the capital raised by a given fund."). 
571See, e.g., SCG Fin. Acquisition Corp., Amendment No. 3 to Registration Statement 
(Form S-1/A), at 37 (Apr. 1, 2011) ("[O]ur sponsor has committed to purchase an aggregate of 
4,666,667 sponsor warrants, each exercisable for one share of our common stock at $11.50 per 
share, for a purchase price of $3.5 million, or $0.75 per warrant, that will also be worthless if we do 
not consummate a business combination."); see also Wittlin & Ferris, supra note 241, at 3.  
572See Barker & Hedin, supra note 43, at 38 ("Approximately 85-100% of the proceeds 
raised in the IPO are held in trust to be used to fund the initial business combination.  Earlier deals 
tended to put 85% in trust.  More recent deals are placing between 95-100% in trust . . . .").  
573See id. ("By placing a greater amount in trust, deals are providing greater protection for 
investors, coupled with greater risk for insiders and underwriters.").  
574See supra note 570 and accompanying text.  
575See supra notes 560, 563 and accompanying text.  
576See Barker & Hedin, supra note 43, at 38.  
577See, e.g., Chart Acquisition Corp., Form S-1, supra note 452, at 6 ("A number of 
founder shares in an amount equal to 2.5% of our shares of common stock issued and outstanding 
 
922 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 37 
 
 
acquired, but when the public corporation proves its worth in the market.578  
Like "skin in the game," performance hurdles reassure both investors and 
targets that the SPAC promoter is committed for the long haul.579  We are no 
longer in the world of the "magic 20."  While the manager earns some of his 
20% upon acquisition, 5% in the most recent SPACs is conditioned on the 
investment actually proving profitable to all parties.580 
Just as investors and targets felt the loss of traditional private equity's 
reputational constraints on SPAC managers, so too did SPAC managers 
suffer from the lack of reputational constraints on investor opportunism in 
the new form.581  In the first generation of SPACs, shareholders could voice 
their objections to an acquisition via vote, and they could also walk away, 
even from an approved acquisition, while still receiving the bulk of their 
investment back from the SPAC trust account.582  While these rights may 
have seemed good in theory, in practice they were redundant because of all 
of the other protections of a SPAC (i.e. the short timeline, the 80% in the 
trust account requirement).583 Worse yet, rather than being a "belt" to the 
"suspenders" protection of the trust account, the shareholder vote became a 
noose around the SPAC manager's neck.  As we saw, the initial 
supermajority vote, with a 20% conversion threshold, created the possibility 
for strategic behavior on the part of shareholders.584   
The conversion threshold creates a moral hazard problem for the 
SPAC investor analogous to the traditional private equity investor's ability to 
renege on capital commitments.585  Remember, as Part II of this Article 
described, private equity investment involved only a limited capital outlay at 
the beginning.586  Opportunistic investors might be tempted to treat their 
commitment like an option and not respond to future capital calls.587  
                                                                                                             
after expiration of the underwriters' overallotment option (excluding the placement shares) are 
subject to forfeiture by our sponsor in the event the last sales price of our stock does not equal or 
exceed $11.50 per share . . . ."); ROI Acquisition Corp., Form S-1, supra note 452, at 9 (stating 
similar language). 
578See Chart Acquisition Corp., Form S-1, supra note 452, at 6.  
579See Barker & Hedin, supra note 43, at 38.  
580See, e.g., Chart Acquisition Corp., Form S-1, supra note 452, at 6 (stating that 2.5% is 
conditioned on one price, and another 2.5% is conditioned on a higher price).   
581See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
582Riemer, supra note 45, at 954-55, 960.  
583See id. at 953-55 (listing the available protections in a SPAC). 
584See Order, supra note 190, 2010 WL 5301044, at *5-*7 (discussing the problem of 
"greenmailing"). 
585See, e.g., supra notes 21-22, 24-25 and accompanying text (describing the reputational 
constraints on private equity funds).  
586See, e.g., supra note 21 (detailing how staged investments work).  
587See, e.g., id. (describing how private investors might renege on their promises).  
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As discussed above in Part II of this Article, reputational considerations 
constrain such opportunism on the part of investors.  As would-be repeat 
players, accredited investors will fulfill their promises because they fear 
being shut out of subsequent investment opportunities.588  
SPAC investors have no such scruples.  Because SPACs trade in the 
open market, SPAC managers have no control over the identity of their 
investors.589  Initially, they felt free to extort SPAC managers with their new 
supermajority power.590  To address the reputational deficit, SPAC sponsors 
developed tactics like "bulldog"591 provisions that limit stockholders from 
voting or converting more than 10% of their stock.592  Further, they raised the 
conversion threshold,593 effectively eliminating the majority vote entirely.594 
We argue that these moves are adaptive responses to the lack of reputational 
constraints in the public markets, and that they reinforce the importance of 
investor reputation in traditional private equity.  Bereft of the reputational 
constraint on investor opportunism, SPAC managers quickly learned to be 
more sparing in granting investor rights.595   
Besides casting light on the importance of reputation in private equity 
contract design, SPACs' evolution allows for insights into the relative 
strengths of two classic strategies to mitigate agency costs: voice and exit.596  
 
                                                                                                             
588See, e.g., supra notes 22, 24-25 (explaining that problems can occur for private equity 
investors who renege).  
589See Davidoff, supra note 4, at 227-28 ("[T]he SPAC phenomenon has been publicly 
attributed and promoted as a private equity substitute, one the public can now freely access."). 
Therefore, because the SPAC does not handpick its investors, such investors are not concerned 
with maintaining a good reputation amongst SPAC managers.  See Sjostrom, supra note 1, at 756; 
Davidoff, supra note 4, at 227-28.   
590See Order, supra note 190, 2010 WL 5301044, at *5-*7 (describing "greenmailing"). 
591See supra note 506 (defining a "bulldog provision").  
592See, e.g., China Res. Dev. Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 12 (Jan. 14, 2011).  
593See, e.g., supra note 504 and accompanying text (discussing 57th St.'s new, high 
conversion threshold).  
594See, e.g., Wittlin & Ferris, supra note 241 ("The key structural modification [to the 
SPAC], . . . is the elimination of the stockholder vote requirement for a proposed acquisition.").  
595See, e.g., Neuhauser, supra note 367 ("[T]he elimination of the shareholder vote was a 
huge step in the right direction.").  
596Albert Hirschman offers the classic description of two prominent strategies in EXIT, 
VOICE, AND LOYALTY, where he describes the choice confronting a consumer: to voice 
complaints or to stop using the product.  See generally HIRSCHMAN, supra note 56, at 4.  
Hirschman's insight has often been cited in corporate scholarship to describe the choices 
confronting shareholders and plaintiffs in a securities class.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 293 n.11 (2010) 
(noting that Hirschman coined the terms "exit" and "voice" to describe "rival strategies for 
influencing large organizations").  But, as the foregoing discussion makes clear, principals do not 
confront a binary choice of voice and exit when seeking protection from agency costs: they are but 
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 We have seen the holdout (i.e. "greenmailing") problems discussed above, 
which a supermajority vote creates.  But if granting shareholders a vote on 
an acquisition remained important in competing for the dollars of potential 
investors, SPAC sponsors could still have easily offered investors a 
conversion threshold of 50%—that is, a simple majority vote.  The sponsors 
of latter-day SPACs, however, denied their investors any approval vote at 
all—at least as a matter of right.597  From Table 4 above, we see that the de 
facto veto provided by the conversion threshold has moved up to an average 
of 75.2% in the most recent SPACs.   
The SPACs' shift from promising a supermajority vote to promising 
no vote at all may seem surprising.  If the vote had value, it certainly would 
have been retained because of the presence of a highly competitive market.598 
SPACs contain a limited number of built-in characteristics, and so can 
compete only based in particular on the identity of their managers599 and the 
particular level of investor protections they offer.600  Because the SPAC 
marketplace is an arena of survival of the fittest, we surmise investors truly 
do not attach importance to the vote, given their willingness to accept the 
tender offer instead.601 
The reason that SPACs eliminated initially robust voting rights is 
clear from the data:  the trust account has taken their place as the primary 
protection mechanism for SPAC investors.602  Ever-increasing amounts have 
been put into trust, from 85% to amounts approaching (or even greater than) 
                                                                                                             
two of many strategies principals can use. 
597See SCG Fin. Acquisition Corp., Form S-1/A, supra note 571, at 20.  SCG Financial 
Acquisition Corp. stated that it would not offer the vote option at all, unless required by law or 
deemed advisable by the sponsors.  Id.  If a vote occurred, a simple majority would be enough to 
approve the acquisition.  See id.  What is important is that the vote is no longer a promised 
protection; instead it is a mere possibility, available only at the discretion of the managers.  Id.    
598See ICR to Host, supra note 537 (listing some of players in the industry).  
599See supra notes 562-65 and accompanying text (explaining the "bet on the jockey" 
theory).  
600See Heyman, supra note 401, at 540 (stating that SPACs "have enough wiggle room to 
alter the structure in ways that make it attractive to investors").  
601See, e.g., supra note 208 and accompanying text (stating that the tender offer is an 
alternative to voting).  The initial SPAC template was negotiated not just between SPAC promoters 
and investors.  The SEC was a necessary intermediary—if the promoters could not convince the 
SEC regulators that the offering was fair to investors, it would not go forward.  See Order, supra 
note 190, 2010 WL 5301044, at *5-*7 (showing the SEC's concern for shareholder protection in the 
SPAC context); see also Heyman, supra note 401, at 540 ("[T]he SEC does not perceive [SPACs] 
as a scam in need of being caught within a wider or more tightly woven regulatory net.").  This 
accounts for the "belt and suspenders" style investor protections that characterize the early SPACs.  
See, e.g., Riemer, supra note 45, at 954-55 (stating these protections) 
602See supra Part VII.B.  
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100%.603  Furthermore, SPACs have often obtained guarantees from their 
investment banks604 or sponsors605 to ensure that the trust account would be 
safe from third-party claims.606  Put simply, the trust account is nearly as 
good as gold; until an acquisition occurs, it offers the shareholder a means of 
withdrawing from the venture at a cost no more than de minimis.607  With 
such robust exit rights, the vote is a mere superfluity.608  Granting it only 
subjects the sponsors, and the entity as a whole, to unnecessary risks of 
mounting transaction costs and delay.609 
The complete elimination of the SPAC vote deepens our 
understanding of shareholder votes in other contexts.  In order for a vote to 
be effective, the voters must be able to separately or collectively monitor 
their agent, agree on a proposed course of action, and coordinate a 
 
                                                                                                             
603See supra notes 520-23 and accompanying text (discussing the high percentages of 
capital that must be in trust account).  
604See, e.g., Sapphire Indus. Corp., Amendment No. 3 to Registration Statement (Form S-
1/A), at 24 (Dec. 28, 2007), stating: 
While we will seek to have all vendors and service providers (which would include 
any third parties we engaged to assist us in any way in connection with our search 
for a target business or businesses) and prospective target businesses execute 
agreements with us waiving any right, title, interest or claim of any kind they may 
have in or to any monies held in the trust account, there is no guarantee that they 
will execute such agreements.  Nor is there any guarantee that, even if such entities 
execute such agreements with us, they will not seek recourse against the trust 
account or that a court would not conclude that such agreements are not legally 
enforceable.  Lazard has agreed to have personal liability to ensure that the 
proceeds in the trust account are not reduced by the claims of target businesses or 
claims of vendors or other entities that are owed money by us for services rendered 
or contracted for or products sold to us. However, it may not be able to satisfy 
those obligations, if it is required to do so.  Furthermore, Lazard will not have any 
personal liability as to any claimed amounts owed to a third party who executed a 
waiver (including a prospective target business or businesses).  
605See, e.g., China Res. Dev. Inc., Amendment No. 6 to Registration Statement (Form S-
1/A), at 16 (June 2, 2011) ("Robin Lee has contractually agreed that, if we liquidate prior to the 
consummation of a business combination, he will be personally liable to ensure that the proceeds in 
the trust account are not reduced by the claims of target businesses or claims of vendors or other 
entities that are owed money by us for services rendered or contracted for or products sold to us."). 
606See supra note 519 and accompanying text.  
607See Riemer, supra note 45, at 960 (discussing pre-2008 SPACs, but emphasizing the 
still accurate point that investors have little to lose).  
608See supra Part VII.B.  
609See Wittlin & Ferris, supra note 241, at 2-3 ("The combination of hedge funds starved for 
cash and hedge funds with a 'yield to trust' strategy made obtaining stockholder approval of 
acquisitions extremely difficult for SPACs.  Uncertainty regarding the outcome of the 
stockholder vote discouraged potential acquisition targets from pursing discussions with SPACs.").  
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response.610  The costs of collective action are low when there are a limited 
number of decision makers.611  Public corporations, in contrast, feature 
countless shareholders who confront a classic collective action problem.612  
As many corporate scholars have noted, public corporation shareholders face 
problems of incentive and effectiveness when trying to use their voting 
power to discipline agents.613  The difficulty is so great that today's 
conventional wisdom is that shareholders should follow the "Wall Street 
Rule" and exit, rather than exercise their voice at all.614   
A recent theory of voting in mutual funds proposed by John Morley 
and Quinn Curtis has complicated the notion of exit and the "Wall Street 
Rule."  Morley and Curtis argue that exit is easier in mutual funds than in 
publicly traded corporations, and that therefore mutual fund shareholders 
have less incentive to make use of the vote than do their public corporation 
counterparts.615  That is, whatever limited value the shareholder vote has in a 
public corporation, it will have even less importance in a mutual fund, which 
is in effect even more liquid than a public corporation because it trades on 
asset value, rather than on an expectation of future cash flows.616  
Morley and Curtis offer theoretical arguments as to why voting mutual 
fund shareholders, with their robust exit right, are relatively less likely to 
make use of the vote.617  SPACs' elimination of the acquisition vote offers 
empirical proof of their claim that stronger exit rights lessen the importance 
of a vote.618  We present actual data indicating that a stronger exit right 
 
                                                                                                             
610See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing 
Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 Yale L.J. 269, 271 (2003) ("The dispersed shareholder 
body is poorly positioned to engage in effective collective action; the costs of monitoring 
management or leading a proxy contest typically far outweigh the benefits to an individual 
shareholder.  As a result, shareholder collective action is rare, even though it may benefit 
shareholders as a group.").   
611John Armour et al., Agency Problems, Legal Strategies, and Enforcement, 4 (European 
Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 135, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436555 ("Multiple principals will face coordination costs, which will 
inhibit their ability to engage in collective action.").  
612See Choi & Fisch, supra 610, at 271.  
613Beginning at least as far back as Berle and Means in 1932.  ADOLF A. BERLE & 
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 252 (Harcourt, 
Brace & World, Inc. rev. ed. 1968) (1932).  
614Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 130 
(2009). 
615Morley & Curtis, supra note 61, at 89-90.  
616Id. at 84.  
617See id. at 89-90.   
618See supra Part VII.B.  
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correlates to less shareholder interest in a vote.619  Thus the SPAC story, 
important in its own right, also offers insight into larger questions of contract 
design. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
The story of SPACs is a story of legal innovation.  This Article has 
provided the first detailed picture of how SPACs have changed over time.  
Using an original dataset, we documented the contours of this exciting new 
corporate form.  The SPAC story has importance in its own right.  We traced 
it in detail, describing how SPACs attempted to reshape the private equity 
mold to the public market.   SPACs borrowed much from the private equity 
contract, most notably by using incentive compensation to align managers' 
interest with those of shareholders, and imposing a time limit on managers' 
use of funds. 
SPAC's original contract design proved to be flawed because SPAC 
entrepreneurs miscalculated the importance of reputation. Without the potent 
reputational constraints the clubby world of private equity afforded, 
managers could no longer claim an unfettered 20% of the profits or omit for 
long the 1% "skin in the game" that traditional private equity managers 
contribute.  Correspondingly, opportunistic hedge funds were free to extort 
concessions from SPAC managers, unhampered by the fear that they were 
risking a chance at future investments.  The SPAC form evolved to respond 
to this danger, but then went one step further and largely eliminated the vote 
on an acquisition.  This development contributes to recent literature by 
deepening our understanding of the relationship between voice and exit.  
The SPAC experience highlights that some exits are cheaper than others and 
suggests that, if the exit is easy enough, a vote may not matter at all. 
 
                                                                                                             
619See supra Tables 1-4.  
